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It is generally agreed that parents should (morally) and 
must (legally) support their children until they reach the age of 
majority. But, in what circumstances must parents support 
their children thereafter? This question becomes further com-
plicated when the children are—or become—disabled. Are par-
ents indefinitely obligated to provide financial support for their 
disabled children? If so, is this a purely moral duty or should it 
be legally enforceable as well? This Article examines these 
questions and posits an answer. 
Consider two scenarios. In the first, a nineteen-year-old 
boy suffers injuries in a plane crash on his way home for 
Christmas. He is left a quadriplegic and is unable to support 
himself for the rest of his life. In the second, doctors diagnose a 
fifty-five-year-old woman as manic depressive, a condition that 
similarly incapacitates her for an indefinite period. Someone 
must care for these individuals. The most likely candidates are 
their parents or the State. Which individuals or institutions, 
however, must ultimately take responsibility? Should the an-
swer depend on the nature of the disability or on whether the 
disability developed prior to the age of majority? 
A recent California case pointedly raised these issues. 
David Culp, a fifty-year-old Stanford Law School graduate who 
practiced family law for nineteen years, filed suit against his 
parents. Culp claimed to suffer from depression and bipolar 
disorder, conditions which made him incapable of supporting 
himself.1 Section 3910(a) of the California Family Code states 
that “the father and mother have an equal responsibility to 
maintain, to the extent of their ability, a child of whatever age 
 
 1. See Petition to Enforce Parental Duty to Support Adult Indigent 
Child, Culp v. Culp, D279304, (Ventura Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2000). 
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who is incapacitated from earning a living and without suffi-
cient means.”2 Concluding that Culp was in fact disabled and 
incapable of supporting himself, the California Superior Court 
ordered Culp’s parents, James and Bertha Culp, to pay their 
son $3,500 a month indefinitely for living expenses.3 
The decision astounds many parents, who are stunned by 
the possibility that they might have to support their adult chil-
dren indefinitely.4 One family law expert referred to the court’s 
holding as a “landmark decision.”5 Clearly, the Culp decision 
raises difficult issues. We naturally expect parents to care for 
their minor children until they are able to care for themselves. 
However, our reactions may change when the state forces par-
ents to pay cash to apparently estranged adult children who 
become disabled in middle age. 
In Part I, I explore the historical background of legally 
mandated parental duties to adult disabled children. Part II 
surveys the positions of the fifty states with regard to whether 
and in what circumstances parents should be required to sup-
port their adult children with disabilities. Parts III and IV then 
turn to normative questions. Part III explores the moral di-
mensions of the problem: from a religious or philosophical per-
spective, should parents support their adult children with dis-
abilities indefinitely? I argue that although a parental moral 
duty often exists, society shares this duty, and therefore it is 
not absolute. The many difficult and personal considerations to 
which this duty is subject complicate the decision whether to 
support a disabled child. Part IV explores the problem from a 
normative legal perspective: should courts recognize a legally 
enforceable requirement that parents support their adult chil-
dren with disabilities indefinitely regardless of the type of dis-
ability, the age of onset, or the family relationship? Section IV 
considers several theoretical and practical justifications that 
weigh heavily against the imposition of such a legal duty. For 
 
 2. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004). 
 3. See Petition to Enforce Parental Duty to Support Adult Indigent 
Child, supra note 1, at 2. 
 4. See Leslie Parrilla, Judge Orders Parents to Support 50-year-old Son, 
VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Aug. 3, 2001, at B01. Even David Culp’s own lawyer, 
Jeff Jennings, stated, “[E]very parent I talk to gets shivers when they hear 
about it.” Id. 
 5. See Robert J. Meadows, Editorial, Court Role Expanded, VENTURA 
COUNTY STAR, Aug. 19, 2001, at B10 (stating that the decision sets a “danger-
ous precedent” that “expands the court’s role in dictating parental care obliga-
tions for adult children”). 
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the foregoing reasons, I argue that the law should not impose 
an unqualified legally enforceable parental duty to support 
adult disabled children. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND   
A. PARENTAL DUTIES TOWARD CHILDREN 
Prior to the Poor Relief Act of 1601, the common law did 
not address whether parents had a legally enforceable duty to 
provide support for their children, even when their children 
were minors. The family was a single unit, with all income and 
property vested in the husband. Since neither the wife nor the 
children had any ownership rights, they were entitled only to 
that which the husband provided them at his uncontrolled dis-
cretion.6 A legal guarantee of parental support was deemed un-
necessary since the law presumed that parents regarded their 
children with the highest possible degree of affection.7 Fur-
thermore, since society expected children to work, as Black-
stone reasoned, “the policy of our laws which are ever watchful 
to promote industry, did not mean to compel a father to main-
tain his idle and lazy children in ease and indolence . . . .”8 
In England, the Poor Relief Act of 1601 revised the com-
mon law to deter individual reliance on various forms of public 
assistance.9 Although these so-called Poor Laws established 
limited and localized forms of public aid, the theory underlying 
the laws was that poverty was an individual problem, not a so-
cial or economic one.10 All able-bodied poor adults and children 
 
 6. See 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 498–501 (2d ed. 1987).  
 7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
435 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765) (“By begetting them, therefore they have 
entered into a voluntary obligation . . . that the life which they have bestowed 
shall be supported and preserved.”). 
 8. See id. at 437; Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child 
Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early Child Support Law, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1123, 1145–46 (1999) (stating that children were expected to work so they 
would not be poor). 
 9. See Marsha Garrison, Anatomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two 
Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 49 (1998). 
 10. See William P. Quigley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare 
Changes in the Millenium [sic] Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 
9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 103 (1998). The poor were generally divided into 
two categories, the aged and impotent poor, who were seen as “worthy” and 
deserving of help, and the able-bodied poor, who were unworthy of help and 
punished if they refused to work. Id. 
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over the age of five had a duty to work.11 The state removed 
destitute children from their homes and apprenticed them if 
their parents could not maintain them.12 Most importantly for 
purposes of this Article, the Elizabethan Poor Laws imposed 
the first statutory child support obligations, allowing local par-
ishes and other sources of community support to recover from 
fathers the costs of providing aid to destitute single mothers 
and their children.13 
The system in colonial America addressed the poor indi-
vidually, often by sheltering them in private homes.14 A par-
ent’s duty to support his children received little formal atten-
tion prior to the 1800s.15 Until then, “children were seen as 
small adults, valued mainly for their ability to contribute to the 
household economy.”16 Attitudes toward child labor stiffened in 
the nineteenth century, as the “view of children as economic as-
sets began to give way to a more romantic, idealized view of 
childhood among the middle and upper classes.”17 
As the American economy shifted from agriculture to in-
dustry, social changes threatened to overwhelm the colonial 
relief system.18 With population increases and urban growth, a 
new class of mobile laborers highly vulnerable to cyclical de-
pressions emerged.19 In addition, desertion became a wide-
spread problem, as men who abandoned their families could re-
locate and find work in relative anonymity.20 Relaxation of 
 
 11. See id. at 103–04. 
 12. See id. at 105 (“Children under fourteen years of age, and above five, 
that live in idleness, and be taken [to] begging, may be put to service by the 
governors of cities, towns [and] to husbandry, or other crafts or labours.”). 
 13. See Garrison, supra note 9, at 48. 
 14. Shannon Bettis Nakabayashi, A “Dual System” of Family Law Revis-
ited: Current Inequities in California’s Child Support Law, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 
593, 597 (2001). (“Puritan Calvinism considered economic rewards to be a sign 
of predestined grace, and class hierarchies provided an opportunity for the 
well-to-do to serve society and God by caring for those with less.”). 
 15. Id. at 598. 
 16. See Hansen, supra note 8, at 1129. 
 17. Id. The fact that fourteen states passed child labor restrictions be-
tween the late 1830s and 1850s demonstrates growing social disdain for child 
labor. Id. at 1130. Indeed, “between the 1820s and the 1840s, most middle-
class families withdrew their children from the labor force and kept them in 
schools, even though most children from working-class families still needed to 
work to supplement their families’ income.” Id. 
 18. Id. at 1132–33. 
 19. See id. at 1133. 
 20. See id. at 1131–32. 
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divorce laws also led to a steady increase in the divorce rate, 
leaving newly divorced mothers to fall into poverty.21 
With the increasing number of single mothers and children 
in need, courts began to challenge common law tradition, find-
ing an affirmative legal duty that parents keep their children 
“off public assistance.”22 In Stanton v. Wilson, one of America’s 
earliest child support cases, the court imposed a duty on a fa-
ther to support his children after divorce, and held further that 
that duty did not cease by virtue of his former wife’s remar-
riage.23 In another early decision, Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 
the court stated:  
[a] parent is under a natural obligation to furnish necessaries for his 
infant children; and if the parents neglect that duty, any other person 
who supplies such necessaries is deemed to have conferred a benefit 
on the delinquent parent, for which the law raises an implied promise 
to pay on the part of the parent.24 
Stanton and Van Valkinburgh thereby began to delineate fac-
tual situations in which courts would recognize child support 
obligations.25 
The Elizabethan Poor Laws provided the foundation neces-
sary to craft new U.S. desertion and nonsupport laws in the 
1870s and 1880s.26 By 1886, eleven states had created a crimi-
nal offense for a father to abandon or refuse to support his mi-
nor children.27 These statutes sought to address a social prob-
lem—the poverty plaguing single mothers and their children—
while simultaneously limiting public welfare expenses.28 Ulti-
mately, state legislatures used these statutes to articulate their 
 
 21. See id. at 1137. 
 22. See id. at 1142. 
 23. 3 Day 37, 56 (Conn. 1808) (holding that Eunice Stanton could recover 
from her ex-husband, the father of her three children, after her second hus-
band died); see id. (“By the divorce the relation of husband and wife was de-
stroyed; but not the relation between [the husband] and his children. His duty 
and liability, as to them, remained the same . . . .”). 
 24. 13 Johns. Ch. 480, 480 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). The court held that a father 
had no duty to reimburse a shopkeeper for a coat which his son purchased us-
ing his father’s credit and without his permission. Id. The father had not ne-
glected his duties to provide “necessaries” for his son. Id. Therefore, the shop-
keeper had extended credit at his own peril. Id. 
 25. See Hansen, supra note 8, at 1136. 
 26. See id. at 1147. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. at 1135. 
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strong desire to prevent women and children’s dependency on 
the welfare state.29 
B. CHILDREN DISABLED BEFORE REACHING THE AGE OF 
MAJORITY 
English common law placed no duty on parents to provide 
continuing support to their adult children, regardless of disabil-
ity. Blackstone, however, argued that “no person is bound to 
provide [a] maintenance for his issue,” “unless where the chil-
dren are impotent, either through infancy, disease or acci-
dent.”30 The Elizabethan Poor Laws reflected his views, 
obligating families to accept responsibility for their disabled 
relatives for three generations.31 
Although historically most states did not require parents to 
provide for their disabled children into adulthood, some juris-
dictions began to recognize such a duty in the early twentieth 
century.32 In Crain v. Mallone, the court reasoned that since an 
adult disabled child was as helpless and dependent upon his 
parents as an infant, his parents had an obligation to continue 
providing for his care.33 In subsequent decisions, courts invoked 
natural law to designate parents as best suited to maintain the 
“wants and weaknesses” of their children.34 
Courts relied on statutes criminalizing a parent’s failure to 
support his child to extend a parent’s duty beyond the disabled 
 
 29. See id. at 1148–49. 
 30. Stanton v. Wilson, 3 Day 37, 58 (Conn. 1808) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 7, at 437). 
 31. See Quigley, supra note 10 (“‘[T]he father and grandfather, and the 
mother and grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind, lame and 
impotent person, or other poor person not able to work . . . [were to] relieve 
and maintain’ their relatives.” (quoting Relief of the Poor Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., 
c. 2, § 7 (Eng.), reprinted in 7 Stat. 30 (1762)) (alteration in original)). 
 32. See Amy P. Hauser, Note, Child Custody for Disabled Adults: What 
Kentucky Families Need, 91 KY. L.J. 667, 669 (2002); Noralyn O. Harlow, An-
notation, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to Support Child, 
48 A.L.R. 4th 919 passim (2003). 
 33. 113 S.W. 67 (Ky. 1908); see also id. at 68 (“[W]e see no difference in 
principle between the duty imposed upon the parent to support the infant and 
the obligation to care for the adult, who is equally, if not more, dependant 
upon the parent.”).  
 34. See Hauser, supra note 32, at 670 (“[T]he wants and weaknesses of 
children render it necessary that some person maintains them, and the voice 
of nature has pointed out the parent as the most fit and proper person.” (quot-
ing 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 190 (13th ed. 1884))). 
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child’s minority.35 Under these statutes, courts generally meas-
ured the duty of continuing support by assessing each party’s 
financial conditions.36 If a child was totally without resources, 
the parents’ obligation to provide support depended upon their 
own financial circumstances.37 Courts expected parents to con-
tribute only the amount necessary to keep the child from desti-
tution and excused from their legal duty parents who did not 
have the ability to pay.38 
In the absence of statutory support, courts found a continu-
ing duty of parental support in case law.39 In Borchert v. Bor-
chert, the court noted this trend, observing that “[t]he doctrine 
of liability in a father to support an incapacitated adult child 
seems to have permeated the courts of this country, in many 
cases without any statutory enactment to support it.”40 To find 
such a duty, courts often employed statutes applicable to minor 
children under the theory that continuing disability prevented 
the child from becoming emancipated and that the disabled 
adult therefore remained a child in the eyes of the law.41 
C. CHILDREN DISABLED POST MAJORITY 
Courts split on the question of whether a parent was obli-
gated to support an adult disabled child if the disability arose 
after he or she reached the legal age of emancipation. In Kru-
vant v. Kruvant, for example, the court noted that “[n]ormal in-
stincts of humanity and plain common sense” dictated an obli-
gation of parental support, which should continue until the 
need terminated.42 The Kruvant court then concluded that this 
 
 35. See id. at 669–70. 
 36. See Harlow, supra note 32, at 922. 
 37. See id. (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 124 Cal. 48, 56 (1899)). 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Hauser, supra note 32, at 670 (noting that it became a “trend” for 
courts to find a parental duty to adult disabled children). 
 40. 45 A.2d 463, 465 (Md. 1946) (“The obligation is set out in a great many 
cases . . . . In some cases the basis of the liability is lack of emancipation. In 
others it is stated to be the moral duty and it is indicated that the legal duty 
follows the moral duty . . . . [I]n view of the many decisions so holding . . . 
there is now a tendency in this country . . . to recognize a duty imposed upon a 
parent to support his incapacitated child.”), superseded by statute, MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-101 (West 2006), as recognized in Freeburger v. Bichell, 
763 A.2d 1226 (2000). 
 41. See Harlow, supra note 32, at 921 (citing Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290 
(1868)). 
 42. 241 A.2d 259 (N.J. 1968); see also id. at 265–66 (holding that a father 
did not have a duty to provide continuing support for his son, who after reach-
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duty did not extend to children who were not disabled or were 
capable of supporting themselves at the time they reached ma-
jority.43 In Mount Pleasant v. Wilcox, the court similarly held 
that a father’s legal duty to support his daughter ended once 
she reached the age of majority without disability and that a 
subsequent change in her condition did not restore his duty.44 
Other courts, however, concluded that parents were mor-
ally and therefore legally obligated to support such children. In 
Burrill v. Sermini, for example, the court held a father liable to 
the state for support of his daughter, who was committed to a 
mental hospital as an adult.45 The court held that a poor law 
statute, applying to “kindred bound by law,” obliged the father 
to provide support, even though his daughter was a married 
adult at the time her disability arose.46 Similarly, in Common-
wealth ex rel. O’Malley v. O’Malley, the Court held that a gen-
eral child support statute that did not distinguish between dis-
abled adult or minor children applied to a parent whose child 
became disabled after reaching majority.47 
D. RECENT HISTORY 
In 1966, New York became one of the first states to repeal 
its statute imposing parental liability for support of disabled 
individuals over the age of majority.48 The change reflected an 
emerging recognition of a more generalized interdependence 
among society’s members.49 In the late 1960s through the 
 
ing majority had his own apartment, traveled to Europe, and held at least two 
jobs before developing a mental disability). 
 43. Id. 
 44. 2 Pa. D. 628 (D. & C. 1893) (holding that a father was not liable to 
support his adult daughter who suffered a mental breakdown); see also Har-
low, supra note 32, at 926 (citing Wilcox). 
 45. 118 N.E. 331, 332 (Mass. 1918).  
 46. See id. (“It is not probable that the legislature intended the liability of 
parents should terminate on the marriage of their children when they were 
made liable for the support of the grandchildren.”). 
 47. 161 A. 883, 884–85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932) (“The presumption undoubt-
edly is that when the child comes of age, the reciprocal duties between father 
and child are at an end, but such presumption is overcome where conditions 
show that either party is incapable of self-support.”). 
 48. See Julianne Sartain, Probate Code Section 15306: Discretionary 
Trusts as a Financial Solution for the Disabled, 37 UCLA L. REV. 595, 606 
(1990) (referring to a California statute imposing familial liability for the sup-
port of the adult disabled as being an “especially outdated notion of financial 
responsibility”). 
 49. See id. at 606–07 (“These far reaching limitations on the financial re-
sponsibility of relatives for support of the needy will lift an often heavy burden 
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1970s, Congress also began to recognize the right of disabled 
citizens to participate in society and passed federal legislation 
that mobilized social, as opposed to familial, resources to effec-
tuate that right.50 The United Nations even declared 1983 
through 1992 the “Decade of Disabled Persons.”51 
This apparent commitment to the societal care and protec-
tion for the disabled, however, did not fully displace prior no-
tions of familial responsibility. More recently, the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) mandated “sweeping changes in several of the laws 
regulating the poor,”52 aimed in part at reducing societal re-
sponsibility for supporting dependent children.53 Reminiscent 
of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, PRWORA reform left govern-
ment responsibility for the poor at the local level and reintro-
 
on those obligated to pay for assistance under existing State laws. Experience 
has shown that the financial responsibility of a broad class of relatives, im-
posed by statute, is more often a destructive rather than cohesive, factor in 
family unity.” (citing Jones v. Jones, 51 Misc. 2d 610, 613 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1966))). 
 50. See Charles D. Siegal, Fifty Years of Disability Law: The Relevance of 
the Universal Declaration, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 271 (1999) 
(discussing the following three acts at the national level: “(1) The 
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968: Requires new federal buildings and those 
constructed with federal funds to be accessible; (2) Rehabilitation Act of 1973: 
Makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of disability in any US govern-
ment-funded program or activity; and (3) Education of All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975” (citation omitted)). 
 51. See id. at 272–73 (“¶ D. 1983–1992: United Nations Decade of Dis-
abled Persons. The United Nations began a significant effort directed to a 
range of projects involving disabilities. It culminated in several significant 
documents in the area; ¶ E. 1984: Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and 
Disability; ¶ F. 1987: United Nations rejected proposed Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Disabled Persons; ¶ G. 
1989: Convention on the Rights of the Child; ¶ H. 1989: Tallinn Guidelines for 
Action on Human Resources Development in the Field of Disability were set 
into place as well; and ¶ I. 1991: General Assembly adopted the Principles for 
the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care.” (citation omitted)). 
 52. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 111 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 
(West 1997)); see Quigley, supra note 10, at 101–02. 
 53. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act; see 
also Hansen, supra note 8, at 1123 (demonstrating bipartisan support for the 
PRWORA, stating, “Representative Jennifer Dunn pointed out that nonpay-
ment of child support was a major cause of welfare dependency” and asking, 
“What happens when that money is not paid? The children and the mother go 
on welfare. And so the taxpayer becomes in effect the parent of those children” 
(quoting The Welfare Bill: The Republicans’ View, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at 
A25)). 
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duced the concept of multi-generational family responsibility.54 
Because society viewed non-payment of child support as a ma-
jor cause of welfare dependency, states strengthened child sup-
port enforcement. Congress emphasized familial responsibility 
by giving states the option to bring an action for support 
against a child’s grandparents in limited circumstances.55 
In August 1996 Congress began to restrict access to Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI). The definition of disability for 
SSI purposes was changed to make it “much more difficult for 
disabled children to qualify for benefits.”56 To save federal 
funds, the PRWORA relied on the private family as the social 
institution capable of rectifying inevitable dependency. The Act 
treated resort to the state as a failure. PRWORA’s apparent ac-
ceptance of the principle that society should not be financially 
responsible for individuals who have relatives to support them 
reversed an earlier acceptance of collective responsibility for 
the disabled. 
Consistent with PRWORA, many state courts continue to 
recognize a duty of parents to support mentally or physically 
disabled adult children. Jurisdictions base liability for an adult 
child incapable of self-maintenance on common law, statute, or 
contractual duties.57 Frequently, courts will imply this duty as 
a means to reimburse the state for the cost of hospitalization. 
Courts also commonly employ this duty in child support pro-
ceedings, in which the custodial parent seeks continued pay-
ments for a disabled adult from the non-custodial parent. The 
next section examines the current state of the law across the 
United States in greater detail. 
II.  CURRENT STATE LAW   
Laws that impose a duty to support adult disabled children 
are potentially relevant to a broad class of Americans, as nearly 
 
 54. See Quigley, supra note 10, at 106. 
 55. See id. at 102 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(18) (West 1997)). 
 56. See id. (“The Act changes eligibility from the lenient ‘comparable se-
verity’ standard . . . to the more narrow standard where an individual under 
the age of 18 shall be considered disabled for purposes of this title if that indi-
vidual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which 
results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be ex-
pected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (West 1997))). 
 57. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Parent’s Obligation to Support Adult 
Child, 1 A.L.R.2d 910, § 5 (1948). 
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one-third of families include at least one disabled member.58 
States use three very different approaches to determine 
whether parents have a duty to support their adult disabled 
children. Not surprisingly, all states have statutes requiring 
parents to support their children until they reach the age of 
majority (eighteen or nineteen) or graduate from high school, 
whichever comes first.59 Beyond this basic requirement, how-
ever, states differ. The first group follows the common law rule 
that does not extend a parent’s duty beyond the child’s minor-
ity, regardless of existing or subsequent disabilities. A second 
group holds parents liable for their adult child’s support if the 
disability arose before the child’s majority. Finally, a third 
group dictates that parents have a duty to support their adult 
disabled child regardless of whether the disability arose prior 
or subsequent to the age of majority. 
A. STATES NOT RECOGNIZING A DUTY TO SUPPORT AFTER 
MAJORITY OR EMANCIPATION 
Many parents are likely unaware of the possibility that the 
state may legally obligate them to support their children 
throughout adulthood. Surprisingly, however, only nine states 
follow the traditional common law rule that a parent’s duty to 
support his or her child ends once that child reaches majority 
or is otherwise emancipated.60 In these nine states, families de-
cide whether and on what conditions they should continue to 
support their disabled child beyond majority or, in cases where 
disability arises post-majority, whether support should resume. 
The statutes and common law of these states reflect a purpose-
ful “hands-off” approach.61 Most of these states’ laws clearly 
 
 58. Michelle T. Friedland, Note, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA’s “Major 
Life Activity” Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171, 188 (1999) (ex-
plaining that 29.2% of American families have at least one disabled family 
member). 
 59. Laura Wish Morgan, The Duty to Support Adult Disabled Children, 
DIVORCE LITIG., Oct. 1997, at 185, available at http://www 
.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art200003.html. 
 60. The nine states are: Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See infra note 
61. 
 61. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2006 (2003); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(5) (2005); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(6) (2004); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (Gould 1999); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2 (2003); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 767.25(4) (West 2001). 
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and concisely terminate parents’ legal duty to their child, re-
gardless of disability, once that child reaches majority.62 
As mentioned, New York specifically amended its child 
support laws in 1966 to relieve parents of legal support obliga-
tions beyond a child’s twenty-first birthday, even if the child is 
disabled.63 The New York legislature made this change out of 
the perception that the prior law had a destructive effect on the 
family unit by placing a heavy and sometimes unmanageable 
burden on families.64 Following the 1966 amendment, the New 
York Supreme Court confirmed that absent an agreement to 
the contrary, no statutory authority legally compels a parent to 
provide financial support to a physically or mentally disabled 
child over the age of twenty-one years, no matter when the dis-
ability arises.65 The court emphasized that the amended stat-
utes no longer provide any exception for disabled children, and, 
in fact, specifically eliminated any such exception so as to 
transfer the parental burden to the state.66 
In absence of a statute explicitly on point, Nebraska courts 
have interpreted related statutory provisions in a manner con-
sistent with the common law. While Nebraska’s statutes give 
courts power to compel parents to support minors, they are si-
lent as to children who have reached the age of majority. The 
Nebraska Supreme Court has reasoned that this silence just as 
clearly confers no authority to compel direct support of adult 
children. As a result, Nebraska law, thus construed, does not 
compel support of an adult child who is disabled.67 
States following this approach are: 
Georgia: Parents have no duty to support an adult disabled 
child beyond the age of majority.68 
Kansas: Parents have no statutory or common law duty to 
support their adult children.69  
Montana: A parent is not obligated to support an eighteen-
year-old or otherwise emancipated child.70  
 
 62. See supra note 61. 
 63. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Beiter v. Beiter, 539 N.Y.S.2d 271, 271 (Sup. Ct. 1989). 
 66. Id. at 272–73. 
 67. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(6) (2004); Meyers v. Meyers, 383 N.W.2d 
784, 789 (Neb. 1986). 
 68. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (2004). 
 69. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2006 (2003). 
 70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(5) (2005). 
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Nebraska: According to common law, parents are not obli-
gated to support their adult disabled children.71 
New York: The New York legislature specifically amended 
child support laws in 1966 to eliminate parental obligation to 
support children, including those who are disabled, after the 
child’s twenty-first birthday.72 The legislature changed the laws 
because such support often placed a heavy burden on families, 
and this burden was more often destructive to the family unit 
than cohesive.73 
North Dakota: Any order requiring parents to support 
children ends when the child graduates high school or reaches 
majority, whichever occurs first.74  
Rhode Island: Courts may order support until the child’s 
twenty-first birthday, regardless of disability.75  
Wisconsin: Parents have no duty to support any child who 
has reached majority.76  
B. STATES REQUIRING A CONTINUING SUPPORT DUTY IF 
DISABILITY ONSET WAS PRIOR TO MAJORITY OR EMANCIPATION 
When a child becomes disabled prior to emancipation, his 
parents may expect that he will not be able to support himself 
as an adult. As a result, parents may be willing and prepared 
to continue their support into adulthood. However, the second 
groups of states—nearly half of all states—make the duty to 
provide continuing support to an adult disabled child legally 
compulsory.77 The laws of these states compel parents with dis-
 
 71. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-664(6). 
 72. See Jones v. Jones, 51 Misc. 2d 610, 615 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1966) (“I find 
that under the new law, the father of a child over the age of 21 has no continu-
ing responsibility for support of that child, regardless of the circumstances or 
of the fact that there is or was an existing order of this court for such sup-
port.”). 
 73. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (Gould 1999) (“[T]here are and probably 
always will be many other cases in which continued support by a parent may 
be a very taxing and sometimes relationship-destroying experience. It is not 
the function of this court to decide upon what the public policy of the State 
shall be. That is the function and prerogative of the Legislature, which in its 
wisdom, adopted this change.”). 
 74. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004). 
 75. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2 (2003). 
 76. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.25(4) (West 2001). 
 77. The twenty-four states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
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abled children incapable of self-support to continue their sup-
port post-majority. In these states, this duty only applies when 
children are disabled prior to the age of emancipation. Children 
who have reached majority become fully emancipated from 
their parents, and a subsequent disability will not resurrect a 
parental duty. 
These states contend that duties growing out of the rela-
tion between parents and their minor children should not 
automatically terminate at the child’s majority, when such duty 
still exists in the forum of conscience.78 The presumption that a 
parent’s duties end when the child reaches majority is over-
come if (a) the child is incapable of earning a livelihood, and (b) 
the parent has the ability to provide assistance. Humanity rec-
ognizes that this duty should exist; therefore, these states im-
pose a legal duty by statute or common law.79 By having par-
ents maintain responsibilities they have already undertaken, 
these states expect to prevent the public from being saddled 
with the financial burden of supporting these people with dis-
abilities. 
The state statutes addressing a parent’s continuing duty 
apply only when the courts extend a current order or when the 
disability arose prior to the child’s majority.80 For example, 
Colorado’s statute mandates that, “If a child is physically or 
mentally incapable of self-support when he attains the age of 
majority, emancipation does not occur, and the duty of parental 
support continues for the duration of the child’s disability.”81 
 
vania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
See infra note 80. 
 78. E.g., Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Servs. v. C.R., 720 A.2d 1004, 
1012–13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998). 
 79. See, e.g., id. 
 80. ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (LexisNexis 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.140(a)(3) 
(2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320B (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-
312(a)(5)(B) (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(1.5)(a)(II) (2005); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 46b-215a (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07 (West 2005); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 31-14-11-18 (LexisNexis 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 405.020 (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125B.110 (LexisNexis 
2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17B-3 (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8 
(2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 45, § 112.1A (West 2006); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4321(3) (West 2001); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-61 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-1, 48-11-103 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-2-204(a) (2005). 
 81. In re Marriage of Cropper, 895 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“[Section 14-10-115(1.5)(a)(II)] provides that emancipation occurs and an or-
der for child support terminates when a child attains nineteen years of age, 
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The Colorado court in Koltay v. Koltay held that, under this 
law, if the child is incapable of self-support, the child is not 
“emancipated,” despite the presumption that twenty-one is the 
age of emancipation.82 A different interpretation would be 
wholly inconsistent with the independence that the word 
emancipation connotes.83 Thus, if a child is physically or men-
tally incapable of self-support when he attains the age of major-
ity, emancipation does not occur, and the duty of parental sup-
port continues for the duration of the child’s disability.84 
Further, the Colorado court in In re Marriage of Cropper or-
dered ongoing support for a mentally disabled child who could 
maintain a job at a supermarket, but required ongoing assis-
tance and thus the child could not be emancipated.85 
A similar Pennsylvania statute imposes a parental duty of 
support if the disability prevents the child from achieving self-
sufficiency and the child’s disability arose prior to attaining 
majority.86 In line with the Colorado statute, the inability to 
self-support prevents the child’s emancipation.87 The parent’s 
moral duty to care for the child forms the basis for the continu-
ing duty.88 The test to determine a parent’s obligation considers 
whether the child is physically and mentally able to engage in 
profitable employment and whether employment is available to 
that child at a supporting wage.89 Thus, even if a mentally or 
physically disabled child is employable, she is still entitled to 
support if she is incapable of complete self-support.90 
Florida’s statute allows the court to require “support for a 
dependant person beyond the age of 18 years when such de-
pendency is because of a mental or physical incapacity which 
began prior to such person reaching majority.”91 Florida’s 
courts have strictly maintained the “prior to reaching majority” 
 
unless the child is then mentally or physically disabled. And, if a child is 
physically or mentally incapable of self-support upon attaining majority at age 
twenty-one, the duty of parental support continues for the duration of the dis-
ability.” (citing Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1983))). 
 82. Koltay, 667 P.2d at 1375–76. 
 83. Id. at 1376. 
 84. Id. 
 85. In re Marriage of Cropper, 895 P.2d at 1158. 
 86. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4321(3) (West 2001). 
 87. Hanson v. Hanson, 625 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1214–15. 
 90. Id. 
 91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07 (West 2005). 
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provision in the statute. In one case, the court denied a 
mother’s request to obtain child support for her mentally dis-
abled child because she did not file the request before her child 
achieved majority.92 The court found that it had no jurisdiction 
to allow the mother’s request,93 but the legislature did allow 
the disabled child to request support from his father directly, 
and the statute permitted the disabled child to bring a claim 
against his parents at any time, so long as the disability existed 
prior to majority.94 
Along these same lines, the plain language of Alabama’s 
statute does not expressly exclude adult disabled children from 
receiving support.95 The applicable case law has interpreted 
“child” to include adult disabled children who are unable to 
support themselves,96 and the Alabama Supreme Court has es-
tablished a parent’s “duty . . . to support [his or her] children 
who continue to be disabled beyond their minority.”97 
Other statutes, including Indiana’s, use slightly different 
wording and require parents to support their children until age 
twenty-one,98 but provide exceptions for equitable reasons or 
for reasons in the best interest of the child.99 These types of 
statutes provide the court with more discretion when determin-
ing whether to extend support beyond the date of majority. 
Still more states recognize the duty to support adult dis-
abled children only at common law.100 Following a common law 
exception, these states recognize that a duty to support a child 
continues into the child’s adulthood if that child was disabled 
prior to reaching majority. New Mexico courts, for example, im-
posed a common law duty to continue support for adult dis-
 
 92. Brown v. Brown, 714 So. 2d 475, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 93. Id. at 476. 
 94. Hastings v. Hastings, 841 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 95. ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (LexisNexis 1998). 
 96. See, e.g., DeMo v. DeMo, 679 So. 2d 265 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). 
 97. Ex parte Brewington, 445 So. 2d 294, 297 (Ala. 1983). 
 98. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-11-18 (LexisNexis 2003). 
 99. Id. § 32-14-11-18(2) (“[The duty to support continues until the age of 
twenty-one unless the] child is incapacitated. If this occurs, the child support 
continues during the incapacity or until further order of the court.”); id. § 31-
16-6-2 (describing the contents of a child support and educational support or-
der). 
 100. Feinberg v. Diamant, 389 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Mass. 1979); Blakley v. 
Blakley, 549 N.W.2d 575 (Mich. 1996), rev’g 534 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1995); Cohn v. Cohn, 934 P.2d 279, 281 (N.M. 1996); Rowell v. Town of Ver-
shire, 19 A. 990, 990 (Vt. 1890); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 204 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1978). 
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abled children until the need for support ceases. The appellate 
court in Cohn v. Cohn remarked that “evolving common law 
[holds] that where a child is of weak body or mind, unable to 
care for himself after coming of age, the parent’s duty to sup-
port the child continues as before and ceases only when the ne-
cessity for support ceases.”101 The theory “that the continuing 
‘disability prevents the child from becoming emancipated’ forms 
the basis of this exception, and because he is incapable of 
emancipation, he remains a minor in the eyes of the law.”102 
Further, the court determined that there is nothing in the 
statutory scheme to indicate any legislative intent to eliminate 
this common law rule.103 
Massachusetts also recognizes the duty to support adult 
disabled children only at common law. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Court in Feinberg v. Diamant held that “a financially 
able divorced parent may be required to contribute to the sup-
port of an adult child who by reason of mental or physical in-
firmity incurs expenses that he or she is unable to meet.”104 
However, because Massachusetts’ statutory law does not im-
pose this burden,105 the court imposes the duty only under its 
general equity powers and in cases concerning the guardian-
ship of incompetents.106 
Operating under the theory that a child disabled prior to 
reaching majority cannot become emancipated, these states re-
quire a parent’s duty to his or her adult child to continue only 
when the disability arose prior to the child’s majority. Whether 
governed by statute or common law, these states recognize that 
this duty should continue for both humanitarian and equitable 
reasons. As such, these states expect a parent to continue sup-
porting an adult disabled child since the parent already 
undertook that duty during the child’s minority. 
States following this approach are: 
Alabama: The laws of Alabama do not expressly exclude 
adult disabled children from receiving support.107 The Alabama 
 
 101. 934 P.2d at 280 (quoting 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 103 
(1987)). 
 102. Id. at 280 (quoting Harlow, supra note 32, at 923) (citing N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-4-7(B)(3)). 
 103. Id. at 281. 
 104. Feinberg, 389 N.E.2d at 1001. 
 105. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West 2006). 
 106. Feinberg, 389 N.E.2d at 1002. 
 107. ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (LexisNexis 1998). 
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Supreme Court has established that it is a parent’s “duty. . . to 
support [his or her] children who continue to be disabled be-
yond their minority.”108  
Alaska: The Alaska Supreme Court held that the parental 
duty of support to continue beyond the age of majority where 
an adult child is incapable of supporting him- or herself by rea-
son of a physical or mental disability.109  
Arizona: Courts may order support to continue past the age 
of majority in the case of a mentally or physically disabled 
child.110  
Arkansas: Courts may order continuation of support even 
after a disabled child reaches majority.111  
Colorado: “If a child is physically or mentally incapable of 
self-support when he attains the age of majority, emancipation 
does not occur, and the duty of parental support continues for 
the duration of the child’s disability.”112  
Connecticut: State statutory law requires parents to sup-
port their children until the children reach age of majority 
(eighteen years of age).113  
Florida: Under state statute, both parents have the duty of 
support when the disability began prior to child’s majority.114  
Indiana: The child must be disabled at the time the child 
reaches the age of majority for a support duty to be imposed.115  
Kentucky: The support duty extends only to those children 
who are mentally or physically incapacitated upon reaching the 
age of majority.116  
Massachusetts: Massachusetts recognizes the continuing 
duty to support adult disabled children only at common law.117  
Michigan: The Supreme Court of Michigan appears to have 
recognized a common law continuing duty of support in excep-
 
 108. Ex parte Brewington, 445 So. 2d 294, 297 (Ala. 1983). 
 109. Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 800 (Alaska 1989). 
 110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320E3 (2004). 
 111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-312(a)(5)(B) (2002). 
 112. Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Colo. 1983); see COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 14-10-115(1.5)(a) (2005). 
 113. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1d (2004). 
 114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07(2) (West 2005). 
 115. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-11-18 (LexisNexis 2003). 
 116. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.020 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 117. Feinberg v. Diamant, 389 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Mass. 1979). 
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tional circumstances, but the language of the opinion on point 
is not specific.118  
Nevada: “The handicap of the child must have occurred be-
fore the age of majority for this duty to apply.”119  
New Jersey: The New Jersey Supreme Court held: A par-
ent is required to support his or her children until they are 
emancipated. When the child suffers from a disability, emanci-
pation does not occur automatically upon reaching the age of 
majority. The court must determine that the fundamental par-
ent and child relationship has concluded.120  
New Mexico: The court recognizes the common law duty to 
continue support for an adult disabled child until the need for 
support ceases.121 
North Carolina: Parents are required to support their chil-
dren only if the children are disabled upon reaching major-
ity.122  
Ohio: The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that that “a 
domestic relations court has jurisdiction to order a noncustodial 
parent to continue to provide support after the age of majority 
if the child is physically or mentally disabled to the extent of 
being incapable of maintaining himself or herself.”123  
Oklahoma: A court may order support for an adult disabled 
child if the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is 
known to exist, on or before the child’s eighteenth birthday.124  
Pennsylvania: “Parents may be liable for the support of 
their children who are 18 years of age or older.”125 The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court has construed the statute to require 
parents to support their child if the child’s physical or mental 
 
 118. See Blakley v. Blakley, 549 N.W.2d 575 (Mich. 1996). 
 119. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125B.110 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 120. Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Servs. v. C.R., 720 A.2d 1004, 1013–14 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (“Defendant’s limited, but voluntary, financial 
involvements in meeting his son’s need is really the affirmative of what was 
always his fundamental duty, even in the presence of a concurrent role re-
quired or permitted of public authorities.”). 
 121. Cohn v. Cohn, 934 P.2d 279, 281 (N.M. 1996) (“We join the majority of 
jurisdictions that hold that parents have a common-law continuing duty to 
support a severely disabled child if, as in this case, the child was so disabled 
before reaching the age of majority.”). 
 122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8 (2005). 
 123. Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ohio 1984). 
 124. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 112.1A (West 2006). 
 125. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4321(3) (West 2001). 
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disability existed when he reached majority and prevents him 
from being self-supporting.126  
Texas: Parents are obligated to support their adult dis-
abled children who were disabled prior to attaining majority.127  
Vermont: The court in Rowell v. Town of Vershire stated 
that at common law, parents owe a duty of support that termi-
nates when a child reaches majority. However, an exception ex-
ists for those children who are disabled and unable to support 
themselves. For those children, the parents’ duty of support 
continues beyond the child’s minority.128  
Virginia: A court may order continued support for a dis-
abled child who is unable to support himself, unable to live in-
dependently, and resides with his parent.129  
Washington: Statutory language suggests that a court may 
order continued support of an adult disabled child if the court 
determines that the child is dependent on the parents, taking 
into consideration the child’s disability.130  
West Virginia: A court may order support for an adult dis-
abled child, provided that the child is unmarried, insolvent, and 
residing with a parent, so long as the child was not emanci-
pated at the time the disability occurred, and regardless of 
whether the disability occurred before or after the age of major-
ity.131  
Wyoming: Parents have a duty to support a disabled child 
when the disability prevents the child from becoming emanci-
pated, regardless of the age of the child.132  
C. STATES RECOGNIZING A SUPPORT DUTY NO MATTER WHEN 
THE DISABILITY ARISES 
Parents of children with no known disability generally as-
sume their children will support themselves as adults. Many 
parents may not be aware of what may happen if their children 
become disabled as adults. For this reason, learning that over 
one-third of all states recognize a parental legal duty to support 
 
 126. Hanson v. Hanson, 625 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006). 
 128. Rowell v. Town of Vershire, 19 A. 990, 990 (Vt. 1890). 
 129. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (2004); § 20-124.2(C) (2004 & Supp. 2006). 
 130. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.002, 26.08.004 (West 2006). 
 131. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-11-103(a)–(b), 2-3-1 (West 2006). 
 132. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-204(a) (2005). 
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an adult disabled child,133 regardless of the timing of the dis-
ability’s onset, shocks most parents. In other words, once a 
child reaches majority and becomes emancipated, a subse-
quently arising disability can revive the parental duty of sup-
port. Courts upholding this revived duty note that parents have 
a compelling moral duty to care for their adult disabled chil-
dren and conclude, as a matter of public policy, that society 
should not be financially responsible for individuals with rela-
tives capable of supporting them. On this basis, courts impose a 
continuing and revived duty on parents to support their adult 
disabled children.134 
Support requirements and justifications vary somewhat 
within this group. A majority of these states have passed stat-
utes confirming a parent’s duty to support an adult disabled 
child, while other states impose the duty via an existing Poor 
Person Statute. These statutes tend to have very clear, concise 
language that leaves little room for judicial discretion to negate 
the duty to support adult disabled children.135 
For example, California’s statute mandates that “parents 
have a duty to maintain . . . a child of whatever age who is in-
capacitated from earning a living and without sufficient 
means.”136 In Woolams v. Woolams, a California appellate court 
held that a father had a duty to support his adult child who be-
came physically disabled after majority.137 Though the adult 
child’s mother devoted all her time and resources to caring for 
the child, the court determined that the father was “capable of 
 
 133. The eighteen states are: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah. See 
infra note 135. The District of Columbia also recognizes this duty. Id. 
 134. Woolams v. Woolams, 251 P.2d 392, 395 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); 
Sayne v. Sayne, 284 S.W.2d 309, 310–12 (Tenn. 1955).  
 135. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503 
(1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1993 & Supp. 2005); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/513 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1(9) (West 
2001); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 229 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-
102(b) (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. § 518.57 (2004); Act of May 31, 2006, 
ch. 280, § 518.54, 2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 15 (West) (to be codified at 
MINN. STAT. § 518.54); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.340 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 109.010 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(17) (1985 & Supp. 2005); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-2, 78-45-3(1), 78-45-4(1) (2002). 
 136. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910(a). 
 137. Woolams v. Woolams, 251 P.2d 392, 395–96 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
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earning an income sufficient to enable himself to pay.”138 The 
court determined that the father could and should be compelled 
to aid in his daughter’s care, thus reviving his parental care 
duty.139 
The court ultimately based its decision on a reference to 
section of 206 of the California Civil Code—now section 3910 of 
the California Family Code—requiring a parent to maintain a 
child who cannot maintain himself.140 This section “provides 
that it is the duty of the parent to support the child to the extent 
of his ability” in order to protect the public from the burden of 
supporting a person who has a parent able to support him.141 
When considering the parents’ ability to pay, the court ac-
knowledged the danger of “the end result [being] two persons 
for the people to support rather than one,” and remarked that, 
“It seems harsh that a man 63 years of age should be required 
to use up his life’s earnings, if necessary to support his child, 
and thereby leave himself no cushion to fall back upon, for the 
years not too distant when he will have very little, if any, earn-
ing ability. Before that cushion should be reduced substan-
tially, however, it would seem that the needs of the child must 
be pared down to a minimum.”142 
The court further stated that under this type of support or-
der, like any child support order, the court retains jurisdic-
tion.143 Thus, if the parent’s circumstances change such that he 
or she faces an intolerable burden in maintaining the support, 
the court can modify the order accordingly. There is nothing fi-
nal about the award.144 Ultimately, the resurrected duty places 
the burden of support on the parents in order to protect the 
public, but it is not meant to impose an undue hardship on the 
parents if they cannot afford the burden themselves. 
Case law in other states interpreting statutes like Califor-
nia’s is consistent with this public policy theory. New Hamp-
shire has a statute that mandates that “[e]very person whose 
income or other resources are more than sufficient to provide 
for his or her reasonable subsistence compatible with decency 
or health owes a duty to support or contribute to the support of 
 
 138. Id. at 395 (citation omitted). 
 139. Id. at 396. 
 140. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910. 
 141. Woolams, 251 P.2d at 396. 
 142. Id. at 395. 
 143. Id. at 395–96. 
 144. See Paxton v. Paxton, 89 P. 1083, 1085 (Cal. 1907). 
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his or her wife, husband, child, father or mother when in 
need.”145 In Delaware’s Poor Person Statute, a parent may be 
ordered to provide support for an adult child who is unable to 
provide for himself.146 The legislative purpose of this statute is 
“to make designated relatives liable for an indigent’s support to 
avoid the use of public funds.”147 
Courts also tend to look to the legislative intent of the 
statute, reasoning that where no reference to the time of the 
occurrence of the disability is made in the statute, no distinc-
tion exists. In Sininger v. Sininger, a Maryland court held that 
a parent who has the means also has the duty to support an 
adult disabled child regardless of the time of the onset of the 
disability.148 The court reasoned that the statute itself makes 
no distinction based on emancipation, and therefore concluding 
that the duty applied only when the disability began prior to 
emancipation would frustrate the legislative intent. The court 
found any distinction based on the timing of the disability’s on-
set is irrelevant.149 
Further, some states follow the humanitarian rule that 
parents should support their adult disabled children because 
the need for support exists and the dictates of humanity requir-
ing parents to support their children before majority should 
also continue thereafter. Tennessee and South Dakota courts 
provide that parents owe a duty of support to their adult dis-
abled children because these children are as helpless as in-
fants.150 If the children have the same needs for support after 
attaining majority as they did before, the parent’s rights and 
duties to the child should not change.151 This approach suggests 
that, although Tennessee has no statute mandating that a par-
ent support his or her adult disabled child, the discretion of the 
court clearly leans in that direction, allowing resurrection of a 
parent’s duty even after the child has reached majority.152 And, 
although South Dakota’s statutes do not provide the court with 
authority or discretion to extend support beyond the child’s age 
 
 145. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 146. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503 (1999). 
 147. Helen B.M. v. Samuel F.D., 479 A.2d 852, 855 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1984). 
 148. 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (Md. 1984). 
 149. Id. at 1357. 
 150. Mower v. Mower, 199 N.W. 42, 42 (S.D. 1924); Sayne v. Sayne, 284 
S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tenn. 1955). 
 151. Mower, 199 N.W. at 42; Sayne, 284 S.W.2d at 311. 
 152. Sayne, 284 S.W.2d at 311–12. 
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of majority,153 the court has chosen to extend the duty nonethe-
less.154  
In yet another approach, Idaho and the District of Colum-
bia impose a statutory duty on living relatives to pay for the 
costs of care when a mentally ill relative has been committed to 
a state facility.155 These laws recognize a duty to support adult 
disabled children only at common law, but add the statutory 
burden for such limited circumstances in order to reduce the fi-
nancial burden on society. 
Thus these states resurrect the parental duty of support 
even when the disability arises long after the child has passed 
the age of majority. This final group of states, imposing a duty 
on parents regardless of the onset of disability, consists of: 
California: Parents have a duty to maintain a child of any 
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without suf-
ficient means.156  
Delaware: Under Delaware’s Poor Person Statute, a parent 
may be ordered to provide child support for an adult child who 
is unable to provide for himself.157 The purpose of this statute 
is to avoid using state resources to support the child. 
District of Columbia: The District of Columbia recognizes a 
duty to support adult disabled children only at common law.158 
However, relatives (the “father, mother, husband, wife and 
adult children”) have a statutory obligation to support a men-
tally ill person hospitalized in a state facility.159  
Hawaii: A statute imposes an obligation on parents to sup-
port an adult disabled child.160  
Idaho: Common law imposes a duty on parents to care for 
their adult disabled children only if the children are already 
suffering from a mental or physical disability when they 
achieve majority. However, if a relative is hospitalized in a 
state facility, parents have a statutory obligation to support the 
child.161  
 
 153. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-6.1 (2004). 
 154. Mower, 199 N.W. at 42. 
 155. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-586, 16-916 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-354 (2000). 
 156. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004). 
 157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503 (1999). 
 158. Nelson v. Nelson, 548 A.2d 109, 111 (D.C. 1988). 
 159. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916. 
 160. HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1993 & Supp. 2005). 
 161. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-354 (2000). 
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Illinois: Parents have a duty to support their adult children 
suffering from a mental or physical incapacity.162  
Iowa: Iowa imposes a statutory duty on parents to support 
their adult disabled children.163  
Louisiana: Louisiana imposes a statutory duty on parents 
to support their adult disabled children.164  
Maine: Baril v. Baril, a 1976 case relying on a repealed 
statute, states that a parent is obligated to support his or her 
adult disabled child.165 Though that case appears to be good 
law, the current statutes are somewhat unclear as to this issue.  
Maryland: Maryland common law and statutory law im-
pose a duty on parents to support their adult disabled chil-
dren.166  
Minnesota: Minnesota imposes a statutory duty on parents 
to support their adult disabled children, and acknowledges a 
common law duty to do so.167  
Mississippi: Statutory law does not impose a legal obliga-
tion on parents to support their adult disabled children, but 
common law recognizes an enforceable duty to do so.168 
Missouri: There is no reason to impose a legal obligation to 
support one’s infant child but not an adult disabled child who is 
just as helpless and dependent on the parent for care.169 If the 
child is physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting 
himself, and if the child is also insolvent and unmarried, the 
court may extend the parental support obligation past the 
child’s eighteenth birthday.170  
New Hampshire: The court may order support past the age 
of majority for a disabled child if it is extending a current or-
der.171 However, the state’s Poor Person Statute, which re-
quires that, if a person has sufficient means, he or she must 
support “his or her wife, husband, child, father or mother when 
 
 162. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/513 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). 
 163. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1(9) (West 2001). 
 164. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 229 (1993). 
 165. 354 A.2d 392 (Me. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1504 (1998). 
 166. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-102(b) (LexisNexis 2003). 
 167. MINN. STAT. § 518.57 (2004); Act of May 31, 2006, ch. 280, § 518.54, 
2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 15 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 518.54). 
 168. Watkins v. Watkins, 337 So. 2d 723, 724–25 (Miss. 1976). 
 169. Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654, 660 (Mo. App. 1958). 
 170. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.340 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 171. Smith v. Stilphen, 344 F. Supp. 2d 794, 797–98 (D.N.H. 2004). 
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in need,” would compel a revival of support duties for an adult 
disabled child.172  
Oregon: “Parents are bound to maintain their children who 
are poor and unable to work to maintain themselves.”173 Nature 
imposes a duty of child support for adult disabled children.  
South Carolina: Courts may order parents to support their 
adult disabled children because such support is in the best in-
terest of the children and the state, and it is conducive to the 
welfare of the family.174  
South Dakota: Statutes do not provide the court with au-
thority or discretion to extend support beyond the age of major-
ity.175 However, courts may order parents to support their adult 
disabled children because the children are as helpless and in-
capable as infants.176  
Tennessee: Parents owe a duty of support to their adult 
disabled children because the children are as helpless as in-
fants and because the children may have the same needs of 
support after attaining majority as before. Therefore, a parent’s 
rights and duties to the child should not change.177  
Utah: Parents may be ordered to support their adult dis-
abled children so as not to burden the public.178  
III.  MORAL DUTIES   
Our general intuition tells us that parents should support 
their adult disabled children in many, if not most, situations. 
This section examines this intuition and where it comes from. 
Moral duties are the set of duties we owe to others and “are de-
signed to check our merely self-interested, emotional, or senti-
mental reactions to serious questions of human conduct.”179 
Society has transformed moral duties into rules as a means of 
encouraging people to cooperate.180 Given the diversity of Am-
erican culture and its varied religious and philosophical tradi-
tions, many forces interconnect to instill moral duties in par-
 
 172. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 173. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.010 (West 2003). 
 174. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(17) (1985 & Supp. 2005). 
 175. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-6.1 (2004). 
 176. Mower v. Mower, 199 N.W. 42, 42 (S.D. 1924). 
 177. Sayne v. Sayne, 284 S.W.2d 309, 311–12 (Tenn. 1955). 
 178. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-2, -3(1), -4(1) (2002). 
 179. See Richard Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Prob-
lematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (1998). 
 180. Id. at 1687. 
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ents to care for their children. Even basic social structures, 
such as the American inheritance system, perform social wel-
fare functions by encouraging “those with means to provide for 
their dependents.”181 
Some social groups encourage extended family members to 
care for children when the parents are unable to do so them-
selves; demonstrating the presence and importance of this 
moral obligation towards children. “Kinship care giving,” pre-
sent in the African-American, Asian-American, Latino, and Na-
tive-American cultures, is one such example.182 Through this 
cultural practice, sometimes called a hidden safety net,183 
“hundreds of thousands of American children are now raised by 
extended family members and non-relatives rather than their 
‘legal’ parents.”184 Furthermore, the basic structure of the fam-
ily unit and child support is “based on faith that individual 
parents’ goodwill and love will motivate them to provide as well 
as possible for their children.”185 Scholars have alternatively 
described parents’ moral obligation as a “natural law duty to 
support their children . . . stemming from the responsibility of 
bringing the child into the world.”186 
Additionally, courts themselves have articulated  
two public policy rationales for extending the obligation of child sup-
port to mentally or physically disabled children beyond the age of ma-
jority: (1) the natural obligation of parents to support their children, 
 
 181. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. 
L. REV. 199, 205 (2001); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 
1–4, in DEATH, TAXES AND PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) 
(“[Inheritance law] encourage[es] those who can to make provision . . . for 
those who are or may be dependents.”). 
 182. Joyce E. McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse Fami-
lies: Building on Trends in Guardianship Reform, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
29, 51–56 (1988); see Foster, supra note 181, at 245–46. 
 183. Foster, supra note 181, at 246 n.236 (citing Randi S. Mandelbaum & 
Susan L. Waysdorf, The D.C. Medical Consent Law: Moving Towards Legal 
Recognition of Kinship Caring, 2 D.C. L. REV. 279, 285 (1994)). 
 184. Id. at 246. 
 185. Leslie J. Harris et al., Making and Breaking Connections Between Par-
ents’ Duty to Support and Right to Control Their Children, 69 OR. L. REV. 689, 
715–16 (1990). 
 186. Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Common Law Frame-
work—Part II, 69 MISS. L.J. 1063, 1064 (2000); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 7, at 435 (“By begetting [children] therefore they have entered into a vol-
untary obligation, to endeavor . . . that the life which they have bestowed shall 
be supported and preserved.”). 
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and (2) the need to “protect the public from the burden of supporting 
a person who has a parent . . . able to support him.”187 
This policy stems from an apparent natural law principle that a 
duty to provide for the maintenance of children falls on the 
parents, and that this obligation continues until the children 
can provide for themselves.188 
Society has come to accept that a parent owes his or her 
child certain moral duties of care. These accepted moral duties 
have stemmed from a combination of various religious 
perspectives on the parent/child relationship, as well as a mul-
titude of philosophical ideals that have developed over time. It 
is not possible in a paper of this length to give a complete ac-
count of the various religious and philosophical perspectives 
that might bear on the problem. A simplified—perhaps even a 
profoundly oversimplified—account may nevertheless be useful. 
A. RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 
Religion in its many forms has “exercised a profound influ-
ence on the development of human culture . . . [and] it has of-
fered powerful motives to right conduct.”189 This section ex-
plores the manner in which the three major religions most 
widely practiced in the United States treat issues of parental 
support of children, and how that treatment fosters a moral 
duty of care towards adult disabled children. All three religions 
recognize parental obligations to a disabled child. 
1. Christianity 
Christianity is the “most widely distributed of the world re-
ligions, having substantial representation in all the populated 
continents of the globe and a total membership that may exceed 
a billion people.”190 As one author noted, “the inherent worth of 
every person as one who has been created in the image of God, 
the sanctity of human life and thus marriage and the family, 
the imperative to strive for justice even in a fallen world—all of 
 
 187. Jeffrey W. Childers, Hendricks v. Sanks: One Small Step for the Con-
tinued Parental Support of Disabled Children Beyond the Age of Majority in 
North Carolina, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2094, 2100 (2002) (quoting Chun v. Chun, 235 
Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 188. Id. 
 189. 12 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 746 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. 
eds., 1911). 
 190. 6 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 250–51 (Norma H. Dickey 
ed., 1986). 
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these are dynamic moral commitments that Christians would 
accept.”191 These virtues also “require[s] parents diligently to 
care for the proper rearing of their children, that is, to provide 
for their bodily, mental, and spiritual well-being . . . in a man-
ner commensurate with their social condition until these latter 
can support themselves.”192 Furthermore, the Christian Bible 
teaches that parents’ duty to their children is to provide for 
them.193 The emphasis on both the importance of family and 
the contention that God created every child whether disabled or 
not, combined with the obligation of parents to care for their 
children, all are consistent with the notion that Christian par-
ents have a moral duty to care for their adult disabled children 
until those children are able to support themselves. 
Some theologians have said that Christianity has not only 
influenced but also elevated society through the “fundamental 
principle that we are all children of the same heavenly Father 
and hence bound to treat our fellow-men not only with justice 
but with mercy and charity, the spirit of generous, self-
sacrificing service, springing from personal devotion to the Di-
vine Saviour and prompting the practice of heroic virtues.”194 
These ideals of charity and goodwill and the spirit of generosity 
towards others further enhance the idea that parents have a 
moral duty or obligation to care for their adult disabled chil-
dren. Since Christianity as a whole encourages each individual 
Christian to assist others less fortunate than him or herself, it 
follows naturally that a parent, who is already under an obliga-
tion to care for his or her own children, should also provide for 
his or her adult disabled children who are unable to support 
themselves.195 
Christians believe their “feelings of love, gratitude, de-
pendence, repentance, and obligation” towards God also require 
them to act morally.196 And this exact feeling of a sense of duty 
 
 191. Id. at 253. 
 192. 11 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 189, at 479. 
 193. E.g., 2 Corinthians 12:14; Job 42:15; 1 Timothy 5:8. 
 194. 12 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 189, at 747. 
 195. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 321 (F.L. Cross 
& E.A. Livingstone, eds., 3d ed. 1997); Matthew 25:34–46 (parable of the sheep 
and the goats); Luke 10:30–37 (parable of the good Samaritan); 1 Corinthians 
13. 
 196. Joseph G. Allegretti, Can Legal Ethics Be Christian, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 453, 459 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 
2001). 
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to act morally encourages, if not requires, that Christian par-
ents support their adult disabled children indefinitely. 
2. Judaism 
The Talmud contains the systematic amplifications and 
analysis of the Mishnah and other teachings used to interpret 
the Jewish law.197 The Talmud never expressly imposes an ob-
ligation of parental support for disabled children—in fact, the 
Talmud imposes only a minimal obligation of parental support 
for children at all.198 One interpretation of the Talmud regard-
ing a father’s duty to his children is that a father has an indi-
rect duty to care for his daughter past the age of minority based 
on the concept of charity.199 However, a father’s duty of paren-
tal support continues in an indirect manner for minors and dis-
abled children incapable of self support. 
Jewish law imposes an obligation on a man to support his 
wife both during marriage and divorce, specifying that a man 
must provide at least a minimum of care for his wife or ex-wife, 
including food, shelter, and clothing.200 This minimum stan-
dard of support functions on a sliding scale so that a man with 
meager means must provide only a bare minimum, while a man 
in a better financial condition must provide more than that 
bare minimum for his wife or ex-wife.201 This obligation toward 
a wife or ex-wife is the basis for a man’s indirect obligation of 
parental support his for children. 
Jewish law views the child as an extension of his or her 
mother. Hence, Jewish law presumes that a Jewish mother will 
not turn her back on her children. The father in turn is re-
quired to provide supplemental support to his wife or ex-wife if 
 
 197. JACOB NEUSNER & TAMARA SONN, COMPARING RELIGIONS THROUGH 
LAW 18–38 (1999). The Jewish religion relies on three different tiers to deci-
pher its law: the Torah, the Talmud, and Shulkhan Aruch. The Talmud is 
used to answer many questions on Jewish law and other relevant issues. Id. at 
32. 
 198. See Eliav Shochetman, On Nature of the Rules Governing Custody of 
Children in Jewish Law, in 10 JEW. L. ANN. 115, 120. In the Jewish religion, 
the financial responsibility of parental support falls on the father only. The 
mother of the child is presumed to provide care for her child. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Exodus 21:10–11. 
 201. See id. A woman’s quality of life is not to change due to divorce, there-
fore, the husband is to provide financial support to maintain her condition in 
life. Id. 
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they have children.202 The Jewish tradition presumes that the 
mother will use this supplemental support to provide care for 
her minor children.203 In this manner, Jewish law provides pa-
rental support for minor children beyond the age of six.204 
The remaining issue is whether a father’s duty of parental 
support continues beyond the age of majority, or, phrased dif-
ferently, whether Jewish law presumes that a Jewish mother 
cares for her children after minority. The Talmud’s express 
teachings have been qualified by commentators and codifiers of 
the Talmud to answer this question.205 Rabbi Yitzchok Lader-
stein, a Professor at Loyola Law School, explains that Moshe 
Fienstein, a leading commentator on Jewish law, was posed 
with a question based on observations of familial relationships 
within a contemporary Jewish Community: do parents have a 
legal duty to provide for their children until they are capable of 
self-support, or is support merely a charity? 206 To understand 
the question fully, he says, we must know two facts. First, most 
Jewish parents today provide financial support for their chil-
dren until they are able to care for themselves, regardless of 
their age.207 Second, members of the Jewish community tradi-
tionally contribute ten percent of net profits to the community 
as a form of charity.208 Thus, the issue is whether the support 
of children can be deducted from that ten percent of that cus-
tomary charitable contribution. 
Fienstein states that Jewish law develops and adapts to 
changes in society, and under that law parents have a legal 
duty to provide support for their children.209 Since Jewish par-
ents today provide support for their children beyond the age of 
majority, Jewish law continues to presume that the mother will 
not turn her back on her adult child.210 Consequently, the fa-
ther has an affirmative duty to provide financial support to his 
 
 202. A father must provide for a child born out of wedlock as well. Id. 
 203. Shochetman, supra note 198, at 120. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 117. 
 206. Interview with Rabbi Yitzchok Laderstien, Law Professor, Loyola Law 
Sch., in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 22, 2002). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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wife or ex-wife that is sufficient to care for any adult children 
as well.211 
This same duty logically extends to the support of disabled 
children. Since parental support for disabled children is com-
mon,212 presumably the mother of a disabled child will want to 
care for her child until the disability is removed or the child can 
care for him- or herself. Thus, the father will have an indirect 
duty to provide support for the disabled child. 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Israel has indicated the 
importance of parental support under Jewish law. The court 
has held that parents do not have the right to rely on someone 
else to perform their parental obligations as long as they have 
the financial ability to do so themselves.213 This observation 
suggests that parents of disabled children do not have the right 
to shift their natural obligations onto the State if they have the 
ability to provide the necessary care. The Talmud’s focus on the 
welfare of the child further supports the proposition that par-
ents of disabled children have an affirmative duty to provide 
support even in the absence of a written law or command.214 
Jewish law views the child “as a precious loan from God [who 
is] to be guarded with love and care.”215 
3. Islam 
Islamic law, in contrast to Christian and Jewish law, 
speaks clearly about parental obligations for disabled adult 
children. Islamic law holds that “the blood relationship between 
the child and his parents, combined with his neediness, entitle 
him to maintenance from them.”216 As in Judaism, in Islam the 
father alone bears a direct obligation of support to the child. 
The Hanafi school (one of four major schools of Islamic law) 
goes further and draws a distinction between a female and 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 503 (1999); see also Morgan, supra note 59 (referencing other states that do 
not have a statute but nevertheless impose an obligation by common law, in-
cluding the District of Columbia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, and Wis-
consin). 
 213. See Pinhas Shiftman, The Welfare of the Child and Religious Consid-
erations, 10 JEWISH L. ANN. 159, 162 (1992). 
 214. Shlomo Nahmias, The Law and the Relationship Between Parents and 
Children, 10 JEWISH L. ANN. 57, 66–67 (1992). 
 215. Id. at 65, 68. 
 216. Ya’Akov Meron, Parents and Children Under Moslem Law, 10 JEWISH 
L. ANN. 213, 215 (1992). 
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male child, and states that a male child has the right to paren-
tal support until the age at which he is able to care for him-
self,217 while a father’s support obligation to his daughter ter-
minates upon her marriage.218 In either case, a mentally or 
physically disabled child, irrespective of age or the time at 
which the disability developed, is entitled to parental sup-
port.219 
While not all formal religious traditions specifically ad-
dress the issue of a parent’s duty to care for his or her child 
past the age of majority, the virtues, tenets, and traditions that 
religion promotes tend to support a moral obligation for parents 
to care for their adult disabled children indefinitely. As one au-
thor has noted, “religion affects the reasons for being moral; . . . 
religion affects the character of human agents; . . . religion af-
fects what . . . a person looks to for guidance when confronting 
a moral problem.”220 We can expect that these religious tradi-
tions may be reflected in the obligations embraced by our legal 
systems. 
B. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Moral philosophy is “the science of human acts in their 
bearing on human happiness and human duty.”221 Throughout 
history, many philosophers and intellectuals have developed 
theories of morality and ethics. These theories have all contrib-
uted, some more than others, to the overall moral intuitions 
that underlie American society. This section will examine three 
major theories and how they understand parents’ moral obliga-
tion to support adult disabled children. 
1. Deontology 
Deontology emphasizes moral duties and moral rights or 
permissions.222 It is the “study of moral obligation,”223 that “ex-
 
 217. Cf. DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 430 (3d ed. 
1998) (stating that a father has an obligation to care for his daughter until she 
is married and has an obligation to care for his son until he reaches puberty). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 430 n.83.  
 220. Allegretti, supra note 196, at 459. 
 221. JOSEPH RICKABY, MORAL PHILOSOPHY: ETHICS, DEONTOLOGY AND 
NATURAL LAW 1 (1919). 
 222. Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s Children: The Prob-
lems of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 211 (2001). 
 223. RICKABY, supra note 221, at 2. 
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pounds and vindicates the idea, I ought.”224 Deontology is the 
“science of ethics,”225 and the “science of Duty.”226 It is an ap-
proach to ethics that posits that we have a duty or obligation to 
treat other human beings in particular ways simply because 
they are human and we must therefore respect their rights and 
dignity.227 A deontologist believes that actions are intrinsically 
right or wrong—if you violate someone’s rights, you commit a 
moral wrong, regardless of the consequences.228 
The standard example of deontological moral theory is 
Immanuel Kant’s theory of categorical imperatives.229 Accord-
ing to Kant, a categorical imperative is a “command (impera-
tive) that holds with no exceptions or qualifications (categori-
cally).”230 Kant believed that everyone knows the difference 
between right and wrong. In order to determine the rightness 
or wrongness of an action, one must decide if the action con-
forms to or obeys that known moral law.231 Kant wrote that 
morality requires that everyone “[a]ct in such a way that you 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, always at the same time as an end and never simply 
as a means”—in other words, to treat them with all respect due 
to a human being.232 Kant argued that one should “act on the 
basis of principles that you would want everyone else to act 
upon.”233 
Deontological ethics would likely hold that parents should 
care for their adult disabled children indefinitely because it is 
the right thing to do.234 Parents “have brought a Being into the 
world who becomes in fact a Citizen of the world, and they have 
placed that Being in a state which they cannot be left to treat 
with indifference.”235 According to Kant, “duties of justice are 
 
 224. Id. at viii. 
 225. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS (James Hastings ed.). 
 226. RICKABY, supra note 221, at viii. 
 227. THOMAS I. WHITE, RIGHT AND WRONG: A BRIEF GUIDE TO UNDER-
STANDING ETHICS 62 (1988). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Solum, supra note 222, at 211. 
 230. WHITE, supra note 227, at 69. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id.  
 233. Solum, supra note 222, at 211. 
 234. See H.A. PRICHARD, MORAL OBLIGATION AND DUTY AND INTEREST 10 
(1968). 
 235. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115 (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark) (1887). 
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external duties,” and the duty is “just to do” or “perform” the 
act.236 Caring for children, regardless of age, who are unable to 
care for themselves, reflects the basic respect for humanity that 
Kant discussed in his theories. Parents should care for their 
own children as they would have wanted their parents to care 
for them, and as they will want their children to care for their 
grandchildren in turn. For as Kant himself wrote:  
Children, as Persons, have, at the same time, an original congenital 
Right—distinguished from mere hereditary Right—to be reared by 
the care of their Parents till they are capable of maintaining them-
selves; and this provision becomes immediately theirs by Law, with-
out any particular juridical Act being required to determine it.237 
The things that people ought to do, and what they feel is correct 
or moral, are these ideas that Kant established that respect the 
basic rights and freedoms of humanity. Thus, deontology 
supports the contention that parents should care for their adult 
disabled children indefinitely. 
2. Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics is most often associated with Aristotle and 
his theory of virtues as acquired dispositional qualities.238 
These virtues are characteristics of mind and will that consti-
tute a good life, where happiness consists of a life lived in ac-
cord with the virtues.239 Accordingly, a “society composed of 
such persons will also flourish,” while a person who possesses 
the corresponding vices “cannot be happy and will not contrib-
ute to the happiness of others.”240 Thus, these “virtue-centered 
theories focus on character rather than action.”241 Virtue ethics 
does not focus on the motives of an individual, but rather “iden-
tifies particular traits as more or less worthy” and then exam-
ines specific acts to determine if “they are of the kind a person 
possessed of worthy character traits would perform.”242 
Since virtue ethicists place such emphasis on the virtues of 
the individual and what he or she can or will add to society, 
they would most likely support parents caring for their adult  
 236. Christine M. Korsgaard, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant 
on the Right to Revolution, in RECLAIMING THE HISTORY OF ETHICS ESSAYS 
FOR JOHN RAWLS 297, 300 (Andrews Reath et al. eds., 1997). 
 237. KANT, supra note 235, at 114. 
 238. Solum, supra note 222, at 212. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. at 214. 
 242. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Eth-
ics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2000). 
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they would most likely support parents caring for their adult 
disabled children. The focus on the particular character of an 
individual would lead parents to question how other parents 
would handle the same situation. Society as a whole would pre-
fer “parents to care for their children,” and other members of 
their family “out of love” instead of a particular duty dictated 
by justice.243 “Virtue ethics expands morality to . . . [include a 
variety of values] that figure into human life,” including both 
individual and social decisions concerning the enhancement of 
“overall quality of human lives.”244 One can see virtue ethics in 
practice in many areas such as family law, where the interests 
of the child and the child’s well-being are more prevalent than 
the needs or concerns of the parents.245 Thus, followers of Aris-
totle and other more modern theories of virtue ethics would 
support the moral obligation of parents to care for their adult 
disabled children until they are able to care for themselves. 
3. Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism signifies that “the ultimate end is and ought 
to be general happiness, and that those actions are right which 
bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number.”246 This 
theory, first distinctly formulated by Jeremy Bentham, 
prioritizes the general happiness of the greatest number of 
people, not just that of an individual.247 Later, J. S. Mill em-
phasized that “the happiness which forms the utilitarian stan-
dard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happi-
ness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness 
and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly 
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”248 As a 
moral theory, utilitarianism says that “utility should be used as 
the guide to individual moral choice.”249 Thus, using this the-
ory, we answer such moral questions as should I care for my 
child affirmatively because such care will enhance utility.250 
Utilitarianism does not establish specific duties other than the 
principle that one must perform an act if that act will produce 
 
 243. Solum, supra note 222, at 215. 
 244. Feldman, supra note 242, at 1437. 
 245. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West Supp. 2006). 
 246. 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 558 (2003). 
 247. See id. at 558–66. 
 248. Id. at 562. 
 249. Solum, supra note 222, at 209. 
 250. Id. at 210. 
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greater utility.251 Therefore, under normal or usual circum-
stances, parents are in the best position to care for their chil-
dren because “parents prefer to do this, because parents can do 
it at a lower cost than others, and because children derive 
greater benefits from parental care than care in orphanages or 
foster homes.”252 
As Thomas White stated, “Bentham tells us that if we want 
to determine the moral character of an action, we should see 
how much pleasure it produces.”253 Modern American society 
and its current views on morality have stemmed from a variety 
of European philosophers.254 Although differing in their views 
on people, character, and actions, most of these philosophers 
would support the contention that parents do in fact have a 
moral obligation to care for their adult disabled children in-
definitely. The philosophical approach addresses more about 
how people can be rather than how most of us are and displays 
the best qualities and possibilities of humanity, which are the 
characteristics of people that are positive and uniquely hu-
man.255 
C. MORAL DUTIES OF SOCIETY 
The foregoing religious and philosophical perspectives il-
lustrate the strong moral obligations placed on parents to care 
for their adult disabled children past the age of majority. These 
moral obligations, however, do not end with parents. In fact, 
many of the best known political, philosophical, and religious 
thinkers have contemplated society’s moral duty to care for the 
destitute and disabled. Aristotle, for example, recognized the 
right of the disabled to obtain subsistence from public funds.256 
John Locke’s “‘first and fundamental natural Law’” was “‘the 
preservation of the Society, and . . . of every person in it.’”257 
 
 251. See id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. WHITE, supra note 227, at 43.  
 254. See id. 
 255. See id. 
 256. Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking 
Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22–23 (1987) (quoting Aristotle, The 
Constitution of Athens, in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND 
OLIGARCHY 190 (J. Moore trans., 1975)). 
 257. Samuel Freeman, Criminal Liability and the Duty to Aid the Dis-
tressed, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1455, 1465 (1994) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, stu-
dent ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698)). 
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With this most basic political principle, he argued that indi-
viduals have a natural right to the material necessities for sur-
vival thereby entitling them to obtain necessities in the form of 
charity from the government, if needed.258 Hobbes’s prudential 
social contract doctrine also acknowledged “public assistance 
[programs] as a legitimate and necessary government func-
tion.”259 Authorizing such assistance, Hobbes commented, “‘And 
whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to 
maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left 
to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for . . . by 
the Laws of the Commonwealth.’”260 Like Locke, Hobbes recog-
nized the dangers of relying on private charity, further com-
menting: “‘[f]or as it is uncharitableness text in any man, to 
neglect the impotent; so it is in the Sovereign of a Common-
wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain char-
ity.’”261 Similarly, Kant required governments to put into place 
public institutions to help the destitute, charging citizens with 
“the perfect duty to support them.”262 
Christian, Jewish, and Islamic religious traditions all ac-
knowledge man’s unique moral worth, as derived from the pos-
session of a soul.263 This recognition of inherent worth neces-
sarily exhibits concern for man’s material welfare.264 Universal 
modern values embrace society’s obligation to provide for hu-
man welfare. For example, Article 25 of the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services . . . .”265 
 
 258. See Joan L. McGregor, This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My 
Land: A Philosophical Reflection on Natural Rights to Property and Environ-
mental Regulations, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 87, 94 (1997).  
 259. Freeman, supra note 257, at 1468. 
 260. See id. (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 239 (Richard Tuck ed., 
Cambridge Univ. 1991) (1651)). 
 261. See id. (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 239 (Richard Tuck ed., 
Cambridge Univ. 1991) (1651)). 
 262. See id. 
 263. Bobby Jindal, Relativism, Neutrality and Transcendentalism: Beyond 
Autonomy, 57 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1263 (1997). 
 264. See id. 
 265. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. Res. 217A, at 
71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1984); see 
also Edelman, supra note 256, at 20. 
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Exactly which social services our government should pro-
vide is the subject of much debate. Ronald Dworkin, a contem-
porary Anglo-American legal scholar, has asserted that since 
society has a moral responsibility to accommodate individuals 
with disabilities, the government should act to fulfill this duty 
by providing the equivalent of an insurance system for the dis-
abled.266 Dworkin premises his argument on Rawls’s “veil of ig-
norance” theory, in which principles of justice are abstracted 
from an “‘original position of equality,’” in which “‘no one knows 
. . . his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abili-
ties, his intelligence, strength and the like.’”267 Since people “in 
the original position must consider whether they . . . may be 
members of the least advantaged class in society[,] . . . [they] 
will choose principles of justice that maximize the life prospects 
of a disadvantaged class.”268 Dworkin believes that prior to 
birth, individuals would be willing to pay into an insurance sys-
tem capable of compensating them, should they be born dis-
abled.269 Under this maxim, justice requires support of the dis-
abled. Implying that support obligations should not fall on the 
parents alone, Dworkin further argues that the government is 
in the best position to establish such a system.270 
While parents have a moral duty to support their disabled 
children, our religious and philosophical traditions suggest that 
society shares this obligation. There is a consensus that a just 
society will not abandon human beings in need. A parent’s 
natural duty to help his adult disabled child merges with soci-
ety’s moral duty to provide public assistance to the disabled, 
and when such institutions do not exist, society has the added 
duty to bring them into existence.271 One final question, then, 
remains: Does the existence of a moral duty necessarily imply 
that the state should impose a legal duty as well? 
 
 266. Friedland, supra note 58, at 191–92. 
 267. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971); see Mark S. Stein, 
Rawls on Redistribution to the Disabled, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 997, 998 
(1998). 
 268. STEIN, supra note 267, at 998. 
 269. Friedland, supra note 58, at 191–92. 
 270. Id. at 192 (arguing that “market-based insurance cannot remedy the 
contingency of disability” and that the government is in the best position to 
spread the costs of accommodating those with disability widely). 
 271. See Freeman, supra note 257, at 1468–69. 
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IV.  LEGAL DUTIES   
The problem of the relationship between law and morality 
is a thorny one. At least some basic aspects of that relationship, 
however, are clear. On one hand, “many moral principles have 
no backing from the law,” and in general, the law does not en-
force morality.272 On the other, there are significant overlaps 
between our moral and legal obligations.273 For example, tort 
law recognizes a moral duty of care to prevent foreseeable harm 
to others.274 Criminal law deals with responsibility for harmful 
acts, employing moral judgments to ascertain the culpability of 
the criminal’s mental state.275 Even contract law has a moral 
dimension when considering whether promises made as part of 
contract should be legally binding.276 
Nevertheless, American law does not recognize any 
overarching duty to assist.277 As a general rule, “‘one has no le-
gal duty to aid another person in peril, even when that aid can 
be rendered without danger or inconvenience to himself.’”278 
There is no such duty even if the one in peril is the adult child 
of the one whose duty is at issue. We may condemn a parent 
morally for failing to come to the aid of his adult child, but in 
general we do not render him legally liable for such failure. 
While this “no duty” rule may occasionally offend our moral 
sensibilities and defy our natural inclinations, several theoreti-
cal and practical considerations arguably justify it. Submitting 
 
 272. Posner, supra note 179, at 1694–95. 
 273. Id. at 1694. 
 274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). 
 275. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 49 (2006). 
 276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 cl. 1 (1981). 
 277. David C. Biggs, “The Good Samaritan Is Packing”: An Overview of the 
Broadened Duty to Aid Your Fellowman, with the Modern Desire to Possess 
Concealed Weapons, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 226, 227 (1997). But see Justin T. 
King, Criminal Law: “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?” Sherrice’s Law: A Balance of 
American Notions of Duty and Liberty, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 621–22 (1999) 
(stating that eight states have enacted “Good Samaritan statutes” that pre-
scribe an affirmative duty to assist, and every state (including the District of 
Columbia) has passed statutes to relieve rescuer liability); John T. Pardun, 
Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
591, 594 n.18 (1998) (recognizing that there is a common law exception to the 
“no duty” rule that arises in the context of “special relationships” between the 
victim and would-be rescuer). “Certain people have a duty of care toward oth-
ers because of their relationship, usually one of dependency: the physician to-
ward his patient, the shopkeeper toward his customer, the employer-employee, 
parent-child.” Pardun, supra, at 594 n.18 (citation omitted). 
 278. Biggs, supra note 277, at 619 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. 
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 203 (2d ed. 1986)). 
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these justifications to exacting scrutiny, the following analysis 
supports the conclusion that the state should not compel famil-
ial support of disabled adult children, but should instead take 
that duty upon itself. 
A. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Several theoretical considerations support the argument 
that the state should not legislate a legally enforceable family 
support duty in this context. First, many commentators assert 
that we should not legislate morality.279 Second, helping a per-
son in distress is recognized to be an altruistic act, worthy of 
encouragement. True altruism is “not motivated by the promise 
of reward or the threat of punishment”; it is motivated instead 
by love, compassion, or sympathy.280 A third theoretical ap-
proach that justifies a “no duty” approach is that our country is 
founded on the principle of individual liberty, under which no 
person has any positive, enforceable legal obligation to others 
except for those obligations that the person has voluntarily ac-
cepted.281 
The first argument used to support this approach is that 
legislating morality is problematic.282 Every person is consid-
ered a “free moral agent,” and morally bankrupt behavior is not 
always punishable as a crime.283 For example, lying or adultery 
may be considered morally bankrupt, but those actions are not 
typically criminal.284 
 
 279. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Be-
fore and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004); King, 
supra note 277, at 619; see Posner, supra note 179, at 1658. 
 280. Posner, supra note 179, at 1658. 
 281. Pardun, supra note 277, at 603. 
 282. Mario J. Rizzo, The Problem of Moral Dirigisme: A New Argument 
Against Moralistic Legislation, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 789, 799 (2005) 
(arguing that the State should not legislate morality because even when so-
ciety can agree on a moral framework, specific moral choices require 
knowledge of specific circumstances that are not foreseeable at the time the 
legislation is passed). 
 283. See King, supra note 277, at 638 n.178 (“Every United States citizen is 
considered a ‘free moral agent,’ unless he or she is imprisoned or otherwise 
lawfully constrained.”). 
 284. Rob Atkinson, Lucifer’s Fiasco: Lawyers, Liars, and L’Affaire Lewin-
sky, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 596 (1999) (observing that “[l]ying is not perse,” 
but pointing out exceptions for fraud and perjury); Sarah Catherine Mowchan, 
Note, A Supreme Court that Is “Willing to Start Down That Road”: The Slip-
pery Slope of Lawrence v. Texas, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 125, 133–36 (2004) 
(discussing the current constitutional status of adultery statutes). 
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A second argument holds that when the government im-
poses an affirmative legal duty, conduct that might otherwise 
have been altruistic becomes forced, and that change under-
mines the give and take of the true altruistic relationship.285 
Applied in the intrafamilial context, this argument seems 
plausible. We expect financially capable parents to want to help 
their adult disabled children for genuinely altruistic reasons—
out of love and compassion for them—and we expect the adult 
child to reciprocate to the extent she is able.286 When such aid 
occurs in the context of a loving interpersonal relationship, re-
ciprocal affection creates a healthy interdependence.287 We ex-
pect both parties, parent and child, to work toward the day 
when the child attains some greater measure of self-
sufficiency.288 However, when aid becomes a legal entitlement, 
loving interdependence risks becoming an antagonistic exac-
tion. Now the adult child has an incentive to remain disabled 
and dependent for as long as possible.289 Not only is the parent 
less likely to think well of the child—and, as a consequence, 
less likely to provide the non-monetary support and aid parents 
commonly provide their adult children—but the child is also 
less likely to think well of herself.290 Whereas a democratic ma-
 
 285. Sheldon Richman, Op-Ed., You Can’t Legislate Goodwill, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 1997, at 19 (“People might find Good Samaritan laws 
reasonable because they believe people should help others in distress. But 
where individual rights are respected and government power is limited, good 
will cannot be enshrined in the law. It would undermine freedom.”); see 
Pardun, supra note 277, at 604 n.84. 
 286. See Catharine H. Stein et al., “Because They’re My Parents”: An Inter-
generational Study of Felt Obligation and Parental Caregiving, 60 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 611, 612 (1998) (addressing societal ideals for the relationship 
between adult children and their parents). 
 287. Allan V. Horwitz et al., Caregiving as Reciprocal Exchange in Families 
with Seriously Mentally Ill Members, 37 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 149, 159 
(1996). 
 288. See Stein et al., supra note 286, at 612 (“Strong social norms that en-
courage independence from the family enhance expectations of appropriate 
levels of self-sufficiency between adults and their parents.”). 
 289. Cf. Jack Robles, Paternal Altruism or Smart Parent Altruism? 2–3 
(Univ. of Colo. Ctr. for Econ. Analysis, Working Paper No. 98-10, 1998), avail-
able at http://www.colorado.edu/econ/CEA/papers98/wp98-10.pdf (observing 
that in an altruistic relationship in which wealth is regularly transferred from 
a donor to a recipient, the recipient is not incentivized to invest in self-
improvement, but instead to overconsume, and advocating a model in which 
gifts of education are used to counter this trend and promote self-sufficiency). 
 290. Cf. Robin M. Jacobson, Americana Healthcare Center v. Randall: The 
Renaissance of Filial Responsibility, 40 S.D. L. REV. 518, 539 (1995) Filial re-
sponsibility laws, holding children responsible for their elderly parents, have 
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jority might willingly grant support in the form of welfare pay-
ments, imposing the equivalent of such payments upon an un-
willing family causes interfamilial strain that undermines the 
loving, altruistic foundation of family life.291 
The third argument holds that legally requiring persons to 
do everything they ought to do could understandably restrict 
the scope of individual decision making. Leaving moral choices 
to the individual preserves individual autonomy, and if we 
want to retain this freedom for ourselves, we must take the risk 
that others will make moral choices we consider to be wrong.292 
Furthermore, situations exist in which a popular consensus 
would relieve parents of the moral duty to support their 
child.293 This feeling is evident in cases where individuals do 
not become disabled until they are well into their adult years. 
As an adult, a child is capable of abandoning and abusing her 
parents, and if she does so, her parents may no longer be mor-
ally obligated to provide for her, even if she should later become 
disabled.294 The law is ill-equipped to consider all the moral 
and ethical dimensions that arise when we derive affirmative 
legal duties from moral obligations.295 
 
been criticized for causing social rejection and loss of self-respect among the 
elderly, and “it is believed that dependence by the elderly on their children for 
their well-being may lead to depression and, ultimately, suicide.” Id. These 
same consequences would seem to apply to responsibility laws holding parents 
responsible for their adult disabled children. Id. 
 291. Id.; cf. Julie A. Ruth et al., Gift Receipt and the Reformation of Inter-
personal Relationships, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 385, 395 (1999) (observing that 
gifts unaccompanied by “symbols of caring” can lead to the deterioration of in-
terpersonal relationships). 
 292. See Goldberg, supra note 279, at 1283–84 (arguing that lawmaking 
based purely on “moral rationales” is illegitimate because people have diver-
gent ideas as to what is moral); Posner, supra note 179, at 1681–82 (arguing 
that moral pluralism is important to society, and that having the laws strictly 
follow one moral philosophy or another would be “a national disaster”). 
 293. In the case of alcohol or drug addiction, requiring parents to support 
their adult child may mean that the child never seeks help for his or her ad-
diction. 
 294. Cf. Jacobson, supra note 290, at 544 (observing that filial responsibil-
ity laws have several common law exceptions that prevent an adult child from 
being required to support their parents and noting that these exceptions apply 
to cases where children were abandoned, have inadequate financial ability to 
pay support, or were poorly treated by their parents). 
 295. Rizzo, supra note 282, at 842. 
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B. PRACTICAL ISSUES 
In addition to the foregoing theoretical considerations, 
there are four serious practical problems with imposing a 
legally enforceable duty on parents to provide specified 
amounts of financial support to their adult children with dis-
abilities. First, courts are not well-suited to adjudicate in-
trafamily relationships. In divorce, spousal support is typically 
temporary, and disappears when the ex-spouse can get back on 
her feet.296 Lawsuits between adult children with disabilities 
and their parents, by contrast, require courts to mediate in-
trafamily squabbles indefinitely. 
A second problem is consistency. If we believe that parents 
should forever bear the burden of their child’s disability, there 
is no obvious reason this burden should end when the parents 
die. The logic underlying statutes that require parents to sup-
port their adult children with disabilities is enforced by stat-
utes that provide for preferential inheritance for such adult 
children as well.297 In addition, it is not obvious why the duty to 
support should be restricted to parents. If the purpose of impos-
ing the duty is to protect the public fisc,298 the law could better 
serve that purpose by imposing the same duty on siblings, 
grandparents, and other family members, as in the case with 
Poor Person Statutes  
A third problem is fairness. If we are going to legislate mo-
rality in the context of adult disabled children, our laws need to 
match our moral intuitions in this context. Our moral intui-
tions, in turn, are likely to be finely nuanced. Whether we be-
lieve a parent has a moral duty to support may turn on how the 
child has treated the parent, on the genuineness of the child’s 
efforts to become self-sufficient, or on competing claims to the 
parent’s resources. No blanket legal rule of support is likely to 
be able to capture those nuances, and any blanket legal rule 
that cannot do so is confiscatory. 
 
 296. Charlotte K. Goldberg, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: Premarital Agree-
ments and Spousalsupport Waivers in California, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 
1261 (2000) (noting that California has a “policy of assisting a spouse to be-
come self-supporting” by awarding temporary spousal support). 
 297. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540(a)(3) (West 1991) (“Adult children of 
the decedent who are physically or mentally incapacitated from earning a liv-
ing and were actually dependent . . . upon the decedent for support [are enti-
tled to such reasonable family allowance out of the estate as is necessary for 
their maintenance according to their circumstances during administration of 
the estate].”). 
 298. See Childers, supra note 187, at 2100.  
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Finally, allowing family members to file lawsuits against 
each other is an inherently problematic solution to which we 
should turn only as a last resort. In many respects, family is a 
bedrock institution of our society.299 Allowing family members 
to sue each other for money risks damaging that institution.300 
Saving the public fisc is not a sufficient reason to take that 
risk. 
Each of these practical reasons, as well as the theoretical 
issues discussed above, combine to make clear that imposing a 
legal duty on parents to support their adult disabled children 
would be unwise. 
1. The Inability of the Court System to Adjudicate 
Parent/Adult Child Support Cases 
Courts can determine with relative ease whether parents 
should support their minor children. If the parental relation-
ship has not been terminated, courts only ordinarily need to 
pose two questions: the age of the child and the amount of the 
parent’s income.301 This simple approach applies regardless of 
whether the parent retains custody and the power to order the 
child’s life.302 
Determining whether to order a parent to support her 
adult disabled child, by contrast, requires much more difficult 
factual determination on the part of a court. An obvious pre-
liminary question is whether the child is “disabled.” In states 
that require parental support of children with disabilities, the 
term “disability” remains largely undefined. In federal law, two 
very different definitions are used for very different purposes. 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), an 
“individual’s disability is (A) physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.”303 The Social Security system, by 
 
 299. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 611 (1987). 
 300. Katie Wise, Caring for Our Parents in an Aging World: Sharing Public 
and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
563, 757 (2002) (“In some states, children who fail to support their indigent 
parents may be found guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony under the state’s 
criminal law. A finding that an adult child has refused or neglected to support 
her parent or parents could result in a fine or imprisonment.”). 
 301. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (amended 1971 and 1973), 
9A U.L.A. 400 (1987). 
 302. Id. 
 303. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(C) (2000). 
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contrast, defines disability as “inability to engage in any sub-
stantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determin-
able physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”304 The pur-
pose of the ADA is to prohibit discrimination against a group 
historically subject to significant discrimination and to help 
that group integrate into the mainstream.305 The purpose of the 
Social Security system, by contrast, is to provide support for 
those unable to support themselves. The Social Security defini-
tion of “disability” is therefore more relevant to state rules re-
quiring the support of adult children with disabilities.306 
Regardless of the definition a state chooses to adopt, 
whether relying on federal law or otherwise, the determination 
of whether someone is “disabled” is expensive and complex. For 
example, the ADA definition requires expert testimony con-
cerning (1) the physical or mental impairment; (2) the substan-
tial nature of the impairment including the effects of any miti-
gating measures; (3) a comparison with the “normal” 
population; and (4) the major life activity allegedly limited.307 
Likewise, the Social Security Administration uses a complex 
procedure to determine whether an individual meets the statu-
tory criteria for assistance.308 A claimant must establish that 
she is not engaging in any substantial and gainful activity. She 
must also show that she meets the statutory severity require-
ment by showing either that she has an impairment the Act 
deems so severe as to automatically preclude substantial gain-
ful activity; or that she is in fact unable to perform her prior oc-
cupation.309 Once these showings are made, the claimant is 
deemed disabled and entitled to benefits unless the Social Se-
curity Administration can demonstrate that she has the ability 
to “perform other work in the national economy.”310 Application 
of the Social Security definition also commonly requires exten-
sive expert testimony, not merely with respect to the nature of 
the individual’s problems, but also with respect to the availabil-
 
 304. Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 
 305. Theodore P. Seto & Sande Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay 
and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1061, 1070 (2006). 
 306. Id. 
 307. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 473–74 (1999). 
 308. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140–42 (1987). 
 309. Id. at 141. 
 310. Id. at 142. 
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ity of gainful work for which the individual might nevertheless 
be suited.311 The Social Security Administration has the neces-
sary resources readily available to litigate such cases; parents 
typically do not. 
Having decided that an adult child is disabled, the court 
faces sometimes intractable problems in the intrafamilial con-
text in determining whether it would be appropriate to order 
financial support—problems that do not arise in the ADA or 
Social Security context. What if the family is trying to encour-
age the alcoholic adult disabled child to get sober? Which side 
should the court take? What if the family is trying to ensure 
that the adult disabled child with mental illness takes her 
medication? What if the parents are trying to save financial re-
sources against a genetically probable onset of Alzheimer’s? 
What if they believe that a more productive use of their limited 
resources would be to fund another child’s college education? It 
seems unlikely that any state would require an order of finan-
cial support regardless of the answers to these questions. Adju-
dicating such questions is well beyond a court’s institutional 
competence.312 
2. Consistency 
State rules requiring the support of adults with disabilities 
are internally inconsistent in at least three regards. If the pur-
pose of a law requiring parents to support their adult disabled 
children is to transfer the responsibility from society to the 
parent, and if there are many ways in which this transfer can 
be accomplished, then the lack of reliance on these solutions 
creates inconsistency within the statutory regimes. Because 
laws recognizing a duty of support do so inconsistently, states 
should either reform their statutory frameworks to achieve 
consistency or abandon these laws as a matter of public pol-
icy.313 
 
 311. Id. 
 312. Cf., e.g., Kevin Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The 
Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts’ 
Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867, 1893–94 (1998) 
(“Competency questions ask whether the judicial response is appropriate for 
the desired results. Because education is governed by a plethora of complex 
issues, the judiciary has been deemed the least capable institution to deter-
mine policy within this social institution.”). 
 313. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2006 (2003) (stating that there is no 
duty to support adult children), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320B (2002) 
(stating that parents must provide continuing support for adult disabled chil-
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The requirement that parents support their adult children 
with disabilities terminates upon the parents’ deaths. A consis-
tently applied support requirement would extend to intestacy 
and inheritance rules, requiring parents to devise sufficient re-
sources to support the adult child with disabilities for the re-
mainder of that child’s life. Only one state, Louisiana, has any 
such protection for children. In other states, however, the rules 
of inheritance work differently: 
Modern American rules governing inheritance . . . are largely based 
on the right of a person to dispose of her own property in any way she 
sees fit. Potential beneficiaries, including children and other direct 
descendants, generally have no ownership rights in property during 
the owner’s lifetime and have no absolute right to receive the property 
of any decedent. This freedom of testation is somewhat restricted by 
statutorily imposed requirements that the testator provide for the 
surviving spouse.314 
If a duty of support is imposed as a matter of principle and 
not merely as a convenient way of saving public funds, inheri-
tance rules should require parental support after death as well. 
Because Black Letter Law dictates otherwise, statutory 
schemes that require parents to support their adult disabled 
 
dren if disability occurred before he or she reaches age of majority), and CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 3910(a) (West 2004) (stating that parents must provide support 
for adult children with disability regardless of when the disability occurred). 
 314. Layton v. Layton, 139 S.E.2d 732, 734 (N.C. 1965) (“The common law 
obligation of a father to support his child is not ‘a debt’ in the legal sense, but 
an obligation imposed by law. It is not a property right of the child but is a 
personal duty of the father which is terminated by his death.”); id. (“The sup-
port of a child by a parent may be the subject of contract and a father may by 
contract create an obligation to support his child which will survive his death 
and constitute a charge against his estate, in which case the ordinary rules of 
contract law are applicable.” (citation omitted)); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheri-
tance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (1994) (“In 
the United States, only [Louisiana] currently provides direct, systematic pro-
tection to a child intentionally disinherited by a parent. In all other states, the 
testator is free to disinherit even needy, minor children, regardless of the size 
of the estate.” (citation omitted)); Judith G. McMullen, Family Support of the 
Disabled: A Legislative Proposal to Create Incentives to Support Disabled Fam-
ily Members, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 439, 443 (1990); see also Melanie B. 
Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235 (1996) 
(responding to court manipulation of testamentary formalities in preference of 
family members with the argument that “‘[t]he first principle of the law of 
wills is freedom of testation.’ One has a right to distribute property upon death 
solely according to the dictates of one’s own desires, unfettered by the con-
straints of society’s moral code or the claims of others” (quoting John H. Lang-
bein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 
(1975))). 
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children should be rejected as a matter of public policy for in-
consistency.315 
Additionally, if the parent-child relationship is the source 
of the support duty, it is unclear why the support requirement 
should flow only one way. If states impose onto parents a legal 
duty to support their adult disabled children, they should also 
impose a duty on children to support their disabled parents. 
Civil filial support laws are currently in effect in twenty states, 
and they range widely in scope and are rarely enforced.316 Rela-
tively few cases invoking these laws are reported in appellate 
court decisions, and trial cases are rarely reported.317 Thus, en-
forcement of these statutes is difficult to measure.318 Although 
the enforcement of filial support laws has declined,319 state 
courts have upheld filial responsibility statutes against consti-
tutional attacks.320 In Swoap v. Superior Court, the California 
Supreme Court upheld a statute that required children to re-
imburse the state for public assistance provided to their indi-
 
 315. See supra note 314. 
 316. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.030, 47.25.230 (2004); ARK CODE ANN. 
§ 20-47-106 (2001); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4400, 4401, 4403, 4410–14 (West 2004); 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12350 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503 
(1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-3 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-16-17-1 to -12 
(LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 252.1,.2, .5, .6, .13 (West 2000); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4731 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-25 (2004); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 40-6-214 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428.070 (LexisNexis 
2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439B.310 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 167:2, 546-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:1-139 to 141, 
44:4-100 (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-10 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 109.010 (West 2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4603 (West Supp. 
2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-7-25, 25-7-27, 28-13-1.1 (2004); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 71-5-103, -115 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-14-2 (2005); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. 9-5-9 (LexisNexis 2003); Wise, supra note 300, at 574. 
 317. Matthew Pakula, A Federal Filial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform 
Tool to Help Combat the Wave of Indigent Elderly, 39 FAM. L.Q. 859, 862 
(2005) (“Today, thirty states have a civil or criminal filial responsibility stat-
ute. Few of those states are actively enforcing their filial responsibility stat-
utes. In fact, eleven states have filial responsibility statutes that have never 
been enforced.”). 
 318. See Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents: Inter-
generational Responsibilities in International Perspective, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 
401, 428 n.146 (2002) (“California and New York appellate courts reported the 
greatest number of cases requiring children to support their aging parents; 
California courts reported eight cases, and New York courts reported three 
cases.”). 
 319. Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy 
Considerations, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 709, 714–15 (2001). 
 320. See, e.g., Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 852 (Cal. 1973). 
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gent parents.321 The court found that the statute did not dis-
criminate on the basis of wealth, but rather selected children to 
bear the financial burden of their elderly parents.322 Conse-
quently, the court held the statute did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.323 The court explained its rationale: 
It seems eminently clear that the selection of the adult children is ra-
tional on the ground that the parents, who are now in need, supported 
and cared for their children during their minority and that such chil-
dren should in return now support to their parents to the extent to 
which they are capable. Since these children received special benefits 
from the class of “parents in need,” it is entirely rational that the 
children bear a special burden with respect to that class.324 
The loss of support for these laws has been attributed to 
the social and economic changes that occurred in the twentieth 
century, which influenced the structure and substance of the 
family relationships.325 However, there is some evidence of con-
tinuing public support for filial support laws. For example, 
Pennsylvania updated and recodified its filial support law in 
2005.326 
Finally, it is unclear why a legal duty of support should ex-
tend only to parents. Most would conclude that brothers and 
sisters have a moral duty to support their adult disabled sib-
lings if they are financially capable of doing so.327 The same is 
probably true of grandparents.328 Imposing such an extended 
legal duty would clearly help preserve the public fisc. If we are 
going to impose a legal duty on parents to support their adult 
 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 850. 
 323. Id. at 852. 
 324. Id. at 851. 
 325. Art Lee, Singapore’s Maintenance of Parents Act: A Lesson to Be 
Learned from the United States, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 671, 681 
(1995) (“[I]ndustrialization and modernization have led to the decline of filial 
support laws is grounded on the theory that industrialization and moderniza-
tion have caused the gradual erosion of traditional notions of filial piety, as 
well as the replacement of the extended family with the nuclear family.”). 
 326. See Katherine C. Pearson, Re-Thinking Filial Support Laws in a Time 
of Medicaid Cutbacks—Effect of Pennsylvania’s Recodification of Colonial-Era 
Poor Laws, 76 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 162 (2005). 
 327. Janet B. Korins, Curran v. Bosze: Toward a Clear Standard for Au-
thorizing Kidney and Bone Marrow Transplants Between Minor Siblings, 16 
VT. L. REV. 499, 531 (1992) (“Members of a family are more than a set of indi-
viduals who inhabit the same house; they are defined in part, and they define 
themselves in part, by the relationships they share with each other. This net-
work of relationships helps to define the moral duties of parents to children, 
and the moral duties between siblings.”). 
 328. Id. 
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disabled children, consistency may require that we extend that 
duty to other family members, both before and after the par-
ents’ deaths. The fact that we do not do so suggests, again, that 
the duty of support is not necessarily imposed on parents as a 
matter of principle. 
Because of pervasive inconsistencies within these statutory 
regimes, public policy requires states to reject this legal duty of 
support as the preferential method of supporting disabled 
adults. 
3. Fairness 
Third, if we are going to legislate morality in the context of 
parental duties to support their adult disabled children, our 
laws need to match our moral intuitions. Otherwise, any legally 
imposed duty of support becomes confiscatory. 
In the intrafamily context, our moral intuitions are likely 
to be finely nuanced. For example, although most would agree 
that parents are morally obliged to care for their children, in a 
legal and practical sense such a law or obligation would be un-
fair toward parents. To require that a parent care for an adult 
child would force the parent to do something he or she may not 
want to do or may lack the ability to do. Such a requirement 
would threaten autonomous moral decision making and un-
dermine individualized self-determination. While from a moral 
perspective it seems obvious that parents will want to care for 
their child, it is illogical in a legal sense to force them to do so. 
“In some instances, such as the assertion that a restraint is jus-
tified to preserve the morals of the regulated person, the indi-
vidual claim easily prevails on its own autonomy basis. Even 
against a justification based on the moral sense of others, the 
claim for autonomy is exceedingly strong.”329 
In some cases, the specific disability of the child may com-
pel parents not to support a child, not because they do not love 
her, but because they feel it is in the child’s best interest to be 
independent and attempt to help herself. Our moral intuitions 
might well support the parents’ decision. A blanket support re-
quirement cannot accommodate these nuanced situations. An 
adult child possibly capable of self-sufficiency may take advan-
tage of a legal duty of support to avoid work or independence. 
Courts administering a blanket legal support requirement are 
 
 329. Wayne McCormack, Property and Liberty—Institutional Competence 
and the Functions of Rights, 51 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994). 
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unlikely to be able to determine the adult child plaintiff ’s moti-
vations with any accuracy; nor do current state support re-
quirements take such motivations into account.330 
Our moral intuitions may also be finely nuanced in terms 
of competing demands on the parents’ resources. Parents may 
wish to help another child financially—perhaps even a minor 
child or a child still in school. Or the parents may correctly 
predict that they will need savings to support themselves in the 
not-too-distant future. Our moral intuitions may well balance 
the net equities in the parents’ favor. In such circumstances, 
therefore, a blanket legal support requirement would be mor-
ally unfair. 
What if parents are unable (but willing to sacrifice), and 
parents are morally inclined to assist? However, in the absence 
of the moral will or financial means, there should be a uniform 
system of government support in place, which will provide for 
the adult disabled population in this country. From a fairness 
standpoint, there should be no law mandating parental sup-
port, and instead there should be programs available to all 
families and all adult disabled children equally. 
4. Family Discord 
In general, the law is extremely reluctant to create in-
trafamily causes of action.331 Where there is no other alterna-
tive—for example, in the context of divorce—it does so.332 By 
and large, however, lawsuits are not viewed as a suitable 
method for resolving intrafamily disagreements.333 Where the 
principal justification for creating a cause of action is to 
 
 330. Cf. McMillan, supra note 312, at 1893–94 (noting that in the context of 
education policy, where many complex issues arise, judges have been deemed 
“the least capable institution” to make policy decisions). 
 331. Leonard Karp, Civil Relief for Victims of “Uncivilized Behavior,” 17 
FAM. ADVOC. 77 (1995) (“For many years, courts and legislatures have used 
the doctrines of inter-spousal and parental tort immunity to preserve ‘domes-
tic harmony’ by refusing to allow an injured person to bring a cause of action 
against a family member.”). 
 332. CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3109 (West 2004). 
 333. Kathy A. Hunt, Using Mediation In Family Law Cases, 27 WYO. L. 
REV. 32, 34 (2004) (“While the court system is the best alternative for conflict 
resolution when all else fails, it is particularly important for attorneys in fam-
ily law matters to thoughtfully consider the option of mediation. The adversar-
ial method and the imposition of court authority are poor substitutes for the 
family itself as the decision-making unit about matters that are of the most 
private and important nature to clients.”). 
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conserve financial resources, creation of such an intrafamily 
cause of action seems particularly inappropriate. 
There is a further problem with causes of action for sup-
port: in theory, at least, the litigation never ends. Family courts 
generally have authority to reevaluate support awards every 
time there is a “change in condition.”334 The resulting court or-
ders often modify or reinstitute support obligations imposed 
under the terms of a prior decree.335 Any time an adult child’s 
disability status changes, further adversarial court proceedings 
are required.336 Any time a parent’s financial situation changes, 
parent and child, again, speak to each other only through their 
lawyers and court pronouncements.337 Family relations are 
naturally strained, as family members entangle themselves in 
ongoing and messy litigation. 
The stated purpose, of course, is to protect public re-
sources.338 Burdening the state courts with perpetual intrafam-
ily litigation, however, will not necessarily achieve this pur-
pose. It may reduce the public assistance roles,339 but it 
substitutes a formal support structure with much greater ad-
ministrative overhead, wasting resources of state courts that 
are already overburdened.340 
In re Marriage of Drake illustrates this problem. The 
Drakes were divorced in 1961. Ten years later, in 1971, David 
Drake, their twenty-one-year-old adult son, was diagnosed with 
paranoid-schizophrenia.341 Twelve years later, in 1983, he 
moved in with his mother. Five years after that, she sued his 
father on his behalf for support.342 Initially, the court issued an 
order requiring support in the amount of $1350 per month.343 
Six years later, in 1994, the mother’s deteriorating health led 
 
 334. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 1079 (2006) (“At any time 
after the entry of a divorce decree, a court may annul, modify, or vary a child 
support award upon an application by either of the parties pursuant to a stat-
ute, or pursuant to a court’s own authority.”). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Childers, supra note 187, at 2100. 
 339. Id. 
 340. See Catherine J. Ross, United Family Courts: Good Sense, Good Jus-
tice, 35 TRIAL 30 (Jan. 1999). 
 341. In re Marriage of Drake, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997). 
 342. Id. at 472–73. 
 343. Id. at 473. 
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her to hire a live-in housekeeper. As a result, the costs she 
claimed as attributable to David’s care increased to $5584 per 
month.344 In the meantime, she had set up a trust fund for her 
son.345 She died while her request for increased support for her 
son was pending.346 Notwithstanding her death, the court de-
nied the father’s motion to terminate the child support order 
proceeding and ordered the father to increase his support pay-
ments.347 At no time during this process was there ever any in-
dication that the adult disabled child was at risk of destitution 
or lack of adequate care. One can only imagine the effect this 
had on the relationship between father and son. 
In Corby v. McCarthy, the court ordered Daniel McCarthy 
to pay $634 a month to his ex-wife for the continuing support of 
their disabled adult daughter, Kelly.348 A few months later, 
Kelly’s mother sought to increase the father’s court-ordered 
 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 472. 
 346. Id. at 473.  
 347. Id. at 478–479. The court held that the cause of action did not abate 
on the mother’s death, because a parent’s duty to support an incapacitated 
child ran to the child. Id. at 475. The trustees could maintain the action as the 
mother’s successors in interest. Id. at 475–76. The trust did not discharge ap-
pellant’s support obligation under CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004) because 
the son could not earn a living if the trust ran dry. In re Marriage of Drake, 62 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476–77. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s calcula-
tion of James’s child support order and affirmed that the Family Code sections 
applied to adult disabled children. Id. at 477–78. His payment calculation was 
based on the following guideline formula provided by CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 4055(a):  
CS = K [HN (H) (TN)]. 
The components of the formula are as follows: 
CS = child support amount. 
K = amount of both parents income to be allocated for child support as 
set forth [below]. 
HN = high earner’s net monthly disposable income. 
H% = approximate percentage of time that the high earner has or will 
have primary physical responsibility for the children compared to the 
other parents . . . . 
TN = total net monthly disposable income of both parties. 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055. The trial court also determined under sections 4061 
and 4062 the amount James should pay for medical costs. In re Marriage of 
Drake, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. The appellate court determined that although 
a trial court may reduce the amount due under the formula if the disabled 
child has independent income, the trial court in this case did not abuse its dis-
cretion by not reducing the support in light of the trust. Id. at 479. 
 348. 840 A.2d 188, 194 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003). This was based on Kelly’s 
need, which amounted to about $1000 a month, her mother’s annual income of 
$20,000, and Daniel’s annual income of about $60,000. Id. 
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support payments when the father’s income rose from about 
$60,000 to $63,228 per year and her income declined.349 Four 
months later, the mother obtained full-time employment; the 
father filed a motion to terminate support altogether.350 The 
trial court reduced the father’s support payments to $100 per 
month, but both parties filed exceptions.351 The state appeals 
court remanded the case for a new calculation, which was to in-
clude reasonable costs of health insurance and housing.352 
There were three trials, an appeal, and a remand for further 
proceedings in the space of less than a year, all to save the 
state less than $10,000. Again, one has to wonder how the re-
peated trips to court affected ongoing intrafamily relations. Un-
fortunately, the complexity of this case is not unusual. When an 
adult child with a disability seeks an order compelling support 
from one or more of her parents, the ensuing litigation cannot 
but lead to a disruption of the family. This is a very real cost—
nonfinancial, but real nevertheless. 
Therefore, the disruption to the family relationship and the 
other costs that would be incurred further support the argu-
ment that our legal system should not impose a legal duty to 
support adult children with disabilities. 
  CONCLUSION   
States differ radically in their answer to the question of 
whether parents should be subject to an ongoing legal duty to 
support adult children whose disabilities prevent them from 
supporting themselves. Nine recognize no such duty. Twenty-
four recognize such a duty only if the child becomes disabled 
prior to majority or emancipation. The remaining eighteen, 
plus the District of Columbia, impose a duty of support regard-
less of when disability occurs. 
Morally there appears to be consensus that parents should 
support their adult disabled children to the extent they are 
 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. Kelly was working full-time for the Veterans Affairs hospital, earn-
ing a gross income of $16,590 per year. Id.  
 351. Id. at 195–96 (noting that the master found Kelly could meet most of 
her monthly needs and recommended a downward reduction in the support 
amount owed). 
 352. Id. at 219–20. During this trial, both Kelly and Bonnie had separate 
apartments in the same apartment complex, although Bonnie spent all her 
time at Kelly’s. Since Kelly could not live on her own reasonably, the cost of a 
larger apartment or alternative housing arrangement was to be included in 
the calculation on remand. Id. at 218–19. 
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able. Whether that moral duty should give rise to a legal cause 
of action is a difficult question. But for a desire to save state re-
sources, the answer would probably be no. The desire to save 
state resources does not, however, outweigh arguments against 
recognizing such a cause of action. 
I do not mean to suggest that the public resources we have 
devoted to caring for adults with disabilities are adequate. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, ten million 
adults have disabilities requiring personal assistance to carry 
out everyday activities, such as getting around the home, get-
ting in or out of bed, bathing, dressing, and eating.353 Among 
those aged seventy-five to seventy-nine, more than half have 
some disability, and thirty-eight percent have a severe disabil-
ity.354 As a given generation ages, the ratio of disabled adults to 
the entire adult population in that generation increases dra-
matically, as shown by statistics compiled by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.355 According to the 2000 census, individuals aged 
seventy-five to eighty-four numbered 12.4 million, and those 
over eighty-five accounted for 4.2 million of the total popula-
tion.356 Those age eighty-five and over constituted the fastest 
growing subgroup within the group of individuals aged sixty-
five and over, and those aged seventy-five to eighty-five consti-
tuted the second fastest growing subgroup.357 
These statistics illustrate the urgency with which we must 
address issues of care for adult disabled persons.358 While it is 
reassuring to know that eighty percent of primary helpers are 
relatives of the disabled,359 governments must address how to 
 
 353. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES 
19-1 (2000), http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/2000/profile2000 
.pdf. 
 354. Id. at 19-2. 
 355. Each successive age group, from the fifteen to twenty-four group to the 
eighty and older group, shows an increase in the incidence of disability of any 
kind, including severe disability resulting in the need for personal assistance. 
The only exception to this trend is a slight decrease in the incidence of severe 
disability between the sixty-five to sixty-nine age group and the seventy to 
seventy-four age group (30.7% to 28.3% respectively). Id. at 19-2 fig.19-2. 
 356. LISA HETZEL & ANNETTA SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 65 YEARS 
AND OVER POPULATION 2 (2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/ 
c2kbr01-10.pdf. 
 357. Id. 
 358. While I use the term “adult disabled person,” I also describe statistics 
relating to population growth among the older segments of the population be-
cause the incidence of disability is more prevalent as we age. 
 359. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BRIEF 1 (1997), http://www.census 
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provide care for the remaining twenty percent. Inviting that 
twenty percent to sue their parents is not the answer. 
The question ultimately is who should provide such care. 
As discussed above, historically, courts and legislatures have 
employed a burden-shifting argument to justify the existence of 
parental support laws. This policy—that the state should not 
have to care for individuals who have family who could support 
them—has existed since Elizabethan times. Since then, how-
ever, society’s recognition of our collective responsibilities has 
expanded.360 In addition, it is not clear that legally enforceable 
parental support rules actually protect the public fisc. 
Compelling theoretical and practical justifications weigh 
heavily against legally enforceable parental support duties. The 
theoretical justifications—that we should not legislate moral-
ity; that true altruism is motivated by love, compassion, or 
sympathy, not by state mandate; and that our nation is 
founded upon the principle of individual liberty, under which 
each person has no positive legal obligations to others enforce-
able by the government except those that are voluntarily ac-
cepted—compel the conclusion that the state should not require 
familial support of adult disabled children. The practical con-
siderations—that courts are not well suited to adjudicate in-
trafamilial relations of this kind, that legislatures would have 
to amend laws governing family relations, that a blanket duty 
of support is likely, in many situations, to violate our intuitive 
notions of fairness, and that the recognition of legal causes of 
action between family members are inherently problematic—
also compel this conclusion. 
Most parents love and care for their children. Even if the 
children have reached adulthood, most parents do all they can 
to provide support. Both religion and moral philosophy support 
the idea that parents should, in most cases, do what they can to 
 
.gov/prod/3/97pubs/cenbr975.pdf. 
 360. Even a century before the rise of the disability rights movement, the 
federal government created the world’s largest and most generously funded 
social insurance scheme with its pension program for disabled Union veterans. 
In 1890, Congress passed the Disability Pension Act, allowing veterans to 
claim benefits for disabilities unrelated to their military service. The Social 
Security Act of 1935 was a response to problems faced by those forced out of 
the workforce by disabilities resulting from an increase in industrialized acci-
dents or old age. While burden-shifting may be an attractive prospect for tax-
payers, the need for programs to assist the disabled will always exist. Such 
federal programs have existed with success since the end of the Civil War. 
This suggests that society is in the best position to assume collective responsi-
bility for our nation’s disabled. 
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support their adult disabled children. Nevertheless, this moral 
duty should not be legally enforceable. Familial support is best 
left to the conscience of individual members. It cannot and 
should not substitute for institutions, governmental or other-
wise, that provide support for persons with disabilities even-
handedly, without regard to the wealth or status of their par-
ents. 
